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CALMING AIDS PHOBIA: 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOW RISK 
OF TRANSMITTING HIV IN THE HEALTH 
CARE SETTING 
American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee t 
Edited by Eric N. Richardson* and Salvatore J. Russo** 
Scientists are concluding that the risk of becoming infected with 
the virus that causes AIDS based on transmission from an infect-
ed health care worker is infinitesimal: in fact, only one health 
care worker has ever been documented as the source of HN trans-
mission to a patient. This Article sets forth the medical evidence 
concerning this low risk and argues that legal decision making 
should incorporate these facts into its analysis of legal problems 
involving HN-infected health care workers. The Article analyzes 
three areas of such legal decision making: (1) employment and 
related credentialling of HN-infected health care workers; (2) 
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liability of such workers to their patients for fear of contracting 
AIDS, including liability under doctrines of informed consent; 
and (3) insurance issues involving health care workers and HIV-
related risks. In all three areas, the Article concludes that the law 
lags behind science and has not yet incorporated the facts about 
the low risk of HIV transmission into its treatment of HIV-infect-
ed health care workers. Until courts and legislatures recognize 
the scientific facts about the low risk of HIV transmission and 
incorporate them into cases and statutes, HIV-infected health care 
workers are likely to suffer unnecessary discrimination and other 
mistreatment. ! 
INTRODUCTION 
Between July 1990 and May 1993, the United States Cen-
ters for Disease Control (CDC) disclosed that six patients 
likely had become infected with the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) while receiving treatment at the offices of David 
Acer, a Florida dentist. 1 These reports propelled public con-
cerns about contracting HIV in the health care setting to the 
very top of the AIDS agenda, generating both much-needed 
attention and potentially damaging public fear and hysteria.2 
The anomaly of the Acer cluster3 has puzzled medical scien-
1. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Investigations of Persons Treated 
by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329 
(1993) [hereinafter CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated]; Centers for Disease 
Control, Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During an Invasive Dental Proce-
dure-Florida, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 21 (1991) [hereinafter CDC, 
Transmission of HIV Infection-Florida]; Centers for Disease Control, Possible 
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient During an Invasive 
Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489 (1990) [hereinafter 
CDC, Possible Transmission of HIV]. 
2. See, e.g., Mike Clary, Florida's Dilemma with AIDS Stirs National Atten-
tion, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1991, at A21 (stating that "in the midst of an epidemic 
that has now spread into every corner of American life, that one [Florida) case has 
made all the difference" in catapulting the state of Florida into the national health 
care spotlight); Phillip J. Hilts, Congress Urges That Doctors Be Tested for AIDS, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at A18 (describing a bill approved by Congress that 
"suggests but does not require that doctors and other health care workers be tested 
for the AIDS virus"); cf Sanford F. Kuvin, A Proactive Public Health Policy for the 
Mandatory Testing of Health Care Workers and Patients Involved in Invasive 
Procedures, 2 CTS. HEALTH SCI. & L. 115 (1991) (advocating that "public health 
officials and the medical profession must be at the forefront of developing a proac-
tive public health policy to prevent the spread of infections between health care 
providers and patients"). 
3. The term "cluster" refers to a group of patients who were infected by 
exposure to one health care worker. See Centers for Disease Control, Recommenda-
tions for Preventing Transmissions of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis 
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tists since its first report.4 No one has ever documented any 
other case of HIV transmission from health care worker to 
patient, despite diligent searches including a host of "look-
back" studies5 conducted with respect to surgeons who per-
formed highly invasive procedures after they had become 
HIV-positive.6 
While the issue of health care workers with HIV has reced-
ed from the public consciousness somewhat since the discov-
ery of the last case in the Acer cluster,7 recent events have 
renewed interest in the topic. In October 1995, the only 
remaining lawsuit brought by one of Dr. Acer's patients was 
settled without a trial, bringing to an end the legal battles 
that arose out of the infections traced to Dr. Acer's practice.8 
But interest in the legal and policy issues illuminated by the 
Acer cluster remains strong. Most notably, proposals for 
mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women and their babies9 
raise many of the same medical, legal, and policy issues as 
earlier proposals for mandatory testing of health care work-
ers. As in the debate over mandatory testing of health care 
workers, 10 policymakers considering mandatory testing of 
pregnant women must balance the benefits of knowledge of 
HIV status with the risks of driving people away from the 
health care system. Fear of HIV and discrimination against 
those who are-or are perceived to be-infected increases 
B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP, 2, 2-3 (1991) [hereinafter CDC Guidelines). 
4. See, e.g., Dennis L. Breo, The Dental AIDS Cases-Murder or an Unsolvable 
Mystery?, 270 JAMA 2732, 2732 (1993) (quoting an epidemiologist who described the 
Acer cluster, "I don't know what happened and we may never know what hap-
pei;ied."). 
5. "Look-back" studies are studies in which the researcher contacts former 
patients of a health care worker who has AIDS to determine whether these patients 
have been infected with the HIV virus. 
6. See Barry Sullivan, When the Environment Is Other People: An Essay on 
Science, Culture, and the Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
597, 623 n.59 (1994). 
7. See CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 331. 
8. Pat Moore, RN-Infected Patient Settles Dispute Against Dentist's Estate, 
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at lB. 
9. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. Sl0,701 (daily ed. July 26, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Kassebaum); see also H.R. 1872, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (aiming to 
reduce the number of HIV infections passed from mother to infant through counsel-
ing and voluntary testing of pregnant women); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Non-
Anonymous Testing of Newborns for HIV: Should It Ever Be Allowed?, 27 J. 
MARsHALL L. REV. 373, 373 (1994) (discussing attempts to enact legislation 
requiring mandatory testing of newborns for HIV on a non-anonymous basis). 
10. Clary, supra note 2, at A21. 
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because of excessive focus on mandatory testing to the 
exclusion of accurate public education about the true risks of 
HIV infection. As a result, it now seems appropriate to renew 
the conversatipn about HIV and the health care worker in a 
dispassionate way, while also broadening the focus of that 
conversation. 
This Article constitutes the American Bar Association (ABA) 
AIDS Coordinating Committee's contribution to that end. 
Since its first meeting in January 1988, the AIDS Coordinat-
ing Committee of the ABA has sought to contribute in a 
constructive and dispassionate way to the public conversation 
concerning the legal and public policy issues raised by the 
AIDS epidemic and to facilitate legal representation of per-
sons affected by HIV. 11 This Article represents the latest in 
that series of efforts and builds upon hearings held by the 
Committee in 1992 in both Washington, D.C. and Chicago on 
the issue of HIV testing of health care workers. 12 
11. See, e.g., William A. Bradford, Jr. et al., The AIDS Epidemic and Health 
Care Reform, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 291-314 (1994) (discussing problems for 
patients with AIDS in obtaining treatment and insurance coverage); Barry Sullivan, 
AIDS: Law, Public Policy, and the Continuing Work of the American Bar Associa-
tion, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 273 (1994) (discussing work of the Committee and 
introducing an article on AIDS and health care reform) [hereinafter Sullivan, AIDS 
Law]; Barry Sullivan, AIDS: Law, Public Policy, and the Work of the American Bar 
Association, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the ABA's policy statements 
and reports concerning AIDS and the legal community); AIDS COORDINATING 
COMM., AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES (Aug. 1988) (describing the 
responsibilities of the AIDS Coordinating Committee as "coordinating the [ABA's] 
ongoing AIDS-related activities, with acting as a catalyst to stimulate new activi-
ties, and with identifying issues for future policy development"). For information on 
the Committee's work in fostering pro bone representation of people with HIV, see 
AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, CREATING A PRO BONO PRO-
JECT FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV: A MANUAL ON How TO START AND MANAGE A 
PRO BONO LEGAL PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS AND HIV (Michele A. Zavos ed.', 
1993) AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL 
RESOURCES FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV (Michele Zavos ed., 1991) (providing 
information on how to develop and run a mostly volunteer AIDS/HIV legal program) 
and AIDS COORDINATION PROJECT, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL 
RESOURCES FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS & HIV (Michele Zavos ed., 1991) (listing by 
state legal aid programs specializing in HIV issues). 
12. AIDS Coordinating Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearings on HIV Testing 
of Health Care Workers: Briefing Book (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Chicago 
Briefing Book] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); 
Transcript of AIDS Coordinating Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearing re: HIV 
Positive Health Care Workers (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Chicago Hearing] 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); AIDS Coordinating 
Comm., American Bar Ass'n, Hearings on HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: 
Briefing Book (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Washington Briefing Book] (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Transcript of AIDS 
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After providing some background information about the low' 
risks of HIV transmission in the health care setting and the 
guidelines issued by the CDC in response to those risks, this 
Article addresses legal developments in three areas: employ-
ment of HIV-infected health care workers; the professional 
relationship between HIV-infected health care workers and 
their patients; and insurance issues for HIV-infected health 
care workers. The Article emphasizes the low risk that HIV 
would be transmitted to a patient from a health care worker 
who follows proper infection control procedures. As a result, 
this Article argues that it is unwise and unnecessary to re-
strict the job performance of such health care workers, to 
require disclosure of their HIV status, to discriminate against 
them in their employ"ee benefits, or for the law otherwise to 
penalize them for their HIV infection. This Article concludes 
that to disadvantage by legal means HIV-positive health care 
workers only fosters irrational fears of HIV and AIDS while 
doing nothing to resolve the public health problems which the 
AIDS epidemic has produced. 13 
I. BACKGROUND CONCERNING AIDS AND 
HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
A. The Scope of the AIDS Epidemic and Infection 
of Health Care Workers. 
As of July 1, 1995, a cumulative total of 1,169,811 cases of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) had been re-
ported worldwide to the World Health Organization (WH0). 14 
This represents a nineteen percent increase over the number 
Coordinating Committee, American Bar Ass'n, Hearing on HIV Testing in the 
Health Care Setting (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter ABA, Washington Hearing) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
13. Public ignorance of the true risks of HIV transmission often results in 
discrimination based on HIV status. At times, this discrimination can result in 
those with AIDS and HIV receiving poor or no medical care. Cf D.B. v. Bloom, 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *15-*16 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1995) (involving an instance in 
which a patient was told by a dentist to leave and obtain care elsewhere due to the 
patient's HIV condition). 
14. Telephone Interview with Dr. Fernando Zacarias, Coordinator, Regional 
Program on HIV/AIDS Standards, Pan American Health Organization (Nov. 13, 
1995). 
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' of cases reported in July 1994.15 In addition, the WHO esti-
mates that 19.5 million persons have been infected with the 
HIV virus since the start of the AIDS epidemic. 16 By 1993, 
HIV had become the leading cause of death among people in 
the United States between twenty-five and forty-four years of 
age, surpassing all other diseases-, automobile accidents, and 
gun violence. 17 As of June 1995, 295,473 individuals had died 
of AIDS in the United States. 18 By June 1995, 476,899 cumu-
lative AIDS cases had been reported in the United States.19 
Further, the incidence of HIV infection is significantly higher 
than the reported number of AIDS cases; CDC e'stimates that 
at least one million Americans, or one in every 250 persons, 
are currently infected.20 
Of this overwhelming total, only forty-six documented AIDS 
cases (0.03% of the total) had resulted from transmission of the 
HIV virus from patients to health care workers as of June 
1995.21 Of the persons with AIDS in the United States reported 
to the CDC through December 31, 1994, 14,591 had been 
employed in the health care industry.22 Health care workers 
represent almost five percent of the AIDS cases for which occu-
pational information is known by CDC.23 
In November 1993, CDC reported the following information 
about the transmission and occurrence of HIV in the health 
care setting: 
15. Id. 
16. Id. The AIDS epidemic began in the late 1970s, and its outbreak in the 
United States was first recognized in an announcement by the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) in June 1981. 42 CDC MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 18-20 (Oct. 1994) 
(providing the Annual Summary of Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths: United 
States, 1993). 
17. 42 CDC MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 18-20 (Oct. 1994). 
18. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
7 CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 14 (mid-year ed. 1995) (tabulations· by 
editors) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT). 
19. Id. at 3, 5. 
20. See David Horgan, AIDS Top Cause of Death for Americans Ages 25-44, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at 26. 
21. Id. at 15. Only the six Acer cases involved transmission of HIV from a health 
care worker to a patient. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
22. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FACTS ABOUT HIV/AIDS 
AND HEALTH CARE WORKERS 1 (1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). 
23. Id. To the extent that the CDC knows the specific health care occupations of 
persons with AIDS, the numbers break down as follows: nurses (3256 cases), health 
aides (2831), technicians (2011), physicians (1287), therapists (719), dental workers 
(365), paramedics (283), and surgeons (90). Id. 
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CDC is aware of 42 health care workers in the United 
States who have been documented as having seroconverted 
to HIV following occupational exposures. Fifteen have 
developed AIDS. These individuals who seroconverted 
include 17 laboratory workers (15 of whom were clinical 
laboratory workers), 13 nurses, 6 physicians, 2 surgical 
technicians, 1 dialysis technician, 1 respiratory therapist, 
1 health aide, and 1 housekeeper/maintenance worker. The 
exposures were as follows: 36 had percutaneous (punc-
ture/cut injury exposure), 4 had mucocutaneous (mucous 
membrane and/or skin) exposure, 1 had both percutaneous 
and mucocutaneous exposure, and 1 had an unknown route 
of exposure. Thirty-eight exposures were to HIV-infected 
blood, 2 to concentrated virus in a laboratory, 1 to visibly 
bloody fluid, and 1 to an unspecified fluid. 
CDC is also aware of 91 other cases of HIV infection or 
AIDS among health-care workers who have not reported 
other risk factors for HIV infection and who report a 
history of occupational exposure to blood, body fluids, or 
HIV-infected laboratory material, but for whom serocon-
version after exposure was not documented. The number 
of these workers who acquired their infection through 
occupational exposures is unknown. 24 
Since that time, even more health care workers likely have 
become infected. 25 
B. Risk of HN Transmission in the Health Care Setting 
Experts on HIV transmission believe that a risk of HIV 
transmission from health care worker to patient could exist 
only in situations where there exists both: (1) a high degree of 
trauma to the patient that would provide a portal of entry for 
24. Id. Seroconversion is the development of antibody response to a disease or 
vaccine. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1300 (4th ed. 1981). In the context 
of HIV, a patient has seroconverted when her blood tests HIV-positive, thus proving 
that she has been invaded by and.has had an immunological experience with HIV. 
See also infra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the "window period" between 
infection and appearance of HIV antibodies). 
25. See CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 15. 
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the virus (e.g., during invasive procedures); and (2) presence 
of blood or other bodily fluid from open tissue of the health 
care worker, as might occur ifthe health care worker sustained 
a needle stick or scalpel injury during an invasive procedure.26 
HIV transmission in the opposite direction, from patient to 
health care worker, has occurred when a health care worker 
was exposed to HIV-infected blood through percutaneous 
exposures (e.g., needle sticks, scalpel lacerations) or mucous 
membrane exposures.27 
The risk of transmission from health care worker to patient 
is far lower than the risk of HIV transmission from patient to 
health care worker. While there has been only one cluster of 
HIV infection apparently transmitted from a health care 
worker to a patient,28 there have been more than forty pub-
lished reports of HIV transmission from patients to health care 
26. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
Summary: Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human 
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III I Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 
34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681, 690 (1985). The CDC has defined the 
term "invasive procedure" as "surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair 
of major traumatic injuries associated with any of the following: 
(1) an operating or delivery room, emergency department or outpatient setting, 
including both physicians' and dentists' offices; (2) cardiac catheterization and 
angiographic procedures; (3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery or other invasive 
obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or (4) the manipulation, 
cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, 
during which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding exists. 
CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 9. The CDC Guidelines also define the phrase 
"exposure-prone invasive procedures" as "certain invasive surgical and dental 
procedures ... implicated in the transmission of [Hepatitis Bl from infected [health 
care workers] to patients" and as percutaneous exposures of patients during surgery 
which are thought to present a greater risk of HIV transmission than other invasive 
procedures. Id. at 4. The CDC Guidelines further describe exposure-prone procedures 
as follows: 
Id. 
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital palpation ofa needle 
tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the [health care worker's] 
fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visualized 
or highly confined anatomic site. Performance of exposure-prone procedures 
presents a recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the [health care worker], 
and-if such an injury occurs-the [health care worker's] blood is likely to contact 
the patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues and/or mucous membranes. 
27. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, ADVISORY STATEMENT: HIV-
INFECTED ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 1 (1991), reprinted in ABA, Chicago Briefing Book; 
supra note 12, pt. 1. 
28. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; infra Part l.C. 
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workers.29 A major study of occupational HIV exposure showed 
that approximately 0.32%, or 3 out of every 1000 health care 
workers e~posed to HIV-infected blood by needle stick, will 
become infected.30 
Due to the small number of reported cases, it is difficult to 
quantify the risk of HIV transmission from health care workers 
to patients, but in any event, the risk is probably very small. 
For example, the New York State Department of Health 
reported that the probability of HIV transmission from an 
infected health care worker to a patient during an invasive 
procedure has been estimated to be between 1per100,000 and 
1 per 1,000,000 procedures.31 On January 30, 1991, the CDC 
released its own estimates of this risk based on: "The number 
of surgeons and dentists with the virus, the number of 
procedures they perform, the number of accidents in which 
protective barriers are breached, and the probabilities of such 
accidents resulting in an infection."32 Using this method, the 
CDC estimated that between 13 and 128 patients may have 
been infected with HIV by HIV-infected doctors and dentists 
during invasive surgical procedures since 1981.33 Based on the 
estimates of the CDC and others, the risk of HIV transmission 
to a patient from a seriously invasive procedure may be in the 
range of 1 in 40,000 to 1 in 400,000.34 
In a subsequent report, the CDC presented a preliminary 
estimate suggesting that up to twenty-eight surgical patients 
could have been infected by invasive procedures performed by 
29. CDC, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 15. 
30. E.g., AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 27, at 1; 
Kathryn A. Phillips et al., The Cost·Effectiveness of HN Testing of Physicians and 
Dentists in the United States, 271 JAMA 851, 853 (1994). 
31. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, POLICY STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES: 
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES & HIV-INFECTED MEDICAL PERSONNEL 3 (Jan. 1991) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
32. Mike Thomas, The Danger Zone: Fear and Doubt Grow Among Besieged 
Health-Care Workers as More Central, Floridians Are Overcome with AIDS, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 31, 1991, at 8. 
33. Id. See also Michael Kinsley, Red Peril: Congress Wastes Time on Doctors with 
AIDS Issue, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12, 1991, at 4 (citing the same CDC statistic, and 
indicating that CDC estimated that 10 to 100 people had been infected by dentists 
and that 3 to 28 people had been infected by surgeons). 
34. Larry Gostin, CDC Guidelines on HN or HBV-Positive Health Care Profes-
sionals Performing Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH 
CARE 140, 141 (1991) (citing M.D. Hagen et al., Routine Pre-Operative Screening for 
HN: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA 1357 
(1988)); Larry Gostin, RN-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive 
Procedures, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1989). 
7 42 University of Michigan Jounwl of Law &form [VOL. 28:4 
infected surgeons since the AIDS epidemic began. 35 Based on 
that estimate, a patient undergoing an invasive surgical pro-
cedure performed by an infected surgeon has a risk of infection 
of between 2.4 to 24 per million.36 Given the data currently 
available, the highest estimated probability of an HIV-infected 
dentist transmitting HIV to a patient is .038 per million.37 . 
To put these risks in proper perspective, one should.compare 
them to other risks patients face in the health care system. For 
example, one hundred out of every million persons undergoing 
general anesthesia die and ten to twenty out of every million 
persons treated with penicillin have an adverse (anaphylactic) 
reaction resulting in death.38 Given this data concerning risks, 
the degree of risk of transmission from health care worker to 
patient, even in "invasive, exposure-prone" procedures, is so 
low as to be immeasurable, or infinitesimaL 
C. The Acer Cluster 
Notwithstanding the high level of public concern about 
contracting HIV from HIV-infected health care workers, there 
has been only one reported instance of a health care worker 
transmitting HIV to his patients. In a July 1990 report, the 
CDC described its investigation of the case of a young woman 
who apparently contracted HIV from her contact with David 
Acer, a Florida dentist who had the virus.39 Seventeen months 
after the dentist had extracted two of her teeth, Kimberley 
Bergalis, the patient, was diagnosed as having oral candidia-
sis.40 Two years after the extractions, she was diagnosed as 
having pneumonia and subsequent blood tests revealed traces 
of the HIV antibody in her blood.41 She had contracted HIV. 
35. See Kinsley, supra note 33. 
36. Julie L. Gerberding, Expected Costs of Implementing a Mandatory Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus Testing and Restriction Program for 
Healthcare Workers Performing Invasive Procedures, 12 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY443, 443 (1991). 
37. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 121 (statement of Eugene Moats). 
38. MICHIGAN DEP'T OF PuB. HEALTH;, MICHIGAN RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIV-
INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS 2 (1991) (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform). 
39. See CDC, Possible Transmission of HN, supra note 1, at 489. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
SUMMER 1995) HIV in the Health Care Setting 743 
Based on its findings that the patient did not have any other 
documented behavioral or other risk factors for HIV infection 
and that the Florida State Department of Health's investiga-
tion demonstrated a striking similarity between the HIV DNA 
sequences from the patient and the dentist, the CDC concluded 
that Ms. Bergalis possibly had been infected with HIV during 
the dental procedure.42 The CDC conducted a follow-up investi-
gation which identified four additional patients of the dentist 
who had become infected with HIV.43 Finally, on May 7, 1993, 
the CDC reported that a sixth patient had become infected 
with HIV while receiving care from Dr. Acer.44 These cases 
have come to be known as the Acer cluster. 
The CDC stated that its "investigation strongly suggest[ed] 
that at least three patients of a dentist with AIDS were in-
fected with HIV during their dental care."45 Although the 
precise mode of transmission was unclear, the CDC speculated 
that the HIV virus could have been transmitted through needle 
stick injuries sustained by the dentist or through use of instru-
ments or other dental equipment previously contaminated with 
blood from either the dentist or another patient.46 The dentist 
reportedly had used barrier precautions, but these techniques 
were not always consistent or in compliance with the universal 
precautions commonly recommended by public health officials.47 
In addition, the CDC found that such precautions often do not 
· prevent punctures or cuts that would allow the dentist's blood 
to flow directly into an open wound or the mucous membranes 
of a patient.48 The CDC also found that the dentist's office did 
not have a written policy for reprocessing dental instruments 
and equipment, and that Dr. Acer did not consistently adhere 
to universal precautions.49 
Although numerous look-back studies have investigated 
whether patients other than Dr. Acer's have contracted HIV 
from infected health care workers, no such cases. have been 
identified.50 In the over seventy look-back studies known to the 
CDC, 19,036 patients of HIV-infected health care workers were 
42. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 27, at 2-3. 
43. See CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 21. 
44. CDC, Inuestigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 329. 
45. CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 26. 
46. Id. at 26-27. 
47. Id. at 26. 
48. Id. at 27. 
49. Id. 
50. E.g., Phillips et al., supra note 30, at 853 & nn.l, 2 & 43-47. 
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tested and none was reported to have been infected by a health 
care worker.51 
Recent data collected in three separate studies suggest that 
the risk of transmission of HIV from surgeons and dentists to 
patients is extremely low. In one study of the patients of an 
HIV-infected surgeon, experts found that there was no HIV 
transmission in 369 person-hours of surgical exposure, indi-
cating that HIV transmission to patients is unlikely to occur 
more frequently than once per thousand person-hours of 
surgical exposure.52 Another study concluded that "the risk of 
transmission from an HIV-infected surgeon to patients un-
dergoing invasive procedures is extremely low."53 A third study 
of the patients of an HIV-infected dentist found that "[a]mong 
900 patients who were actually tested, there were 6,901 
dentist-patient contacts without transmission, a rate of less 
than 0.0002 per contact."54 Although a small number of HIV-
infected patients who did not have other risk factors were 
identified in these look-back studies, DNA sequence testing 
satisfied the researchers that these patients had not contracted 
the virus from an infected health care worker.55 Finally, the 
most recent estimates of the CDC suggest that the risk of a 
single patient contracting HIV from an infected surgeon ranges 
from one in 42,000 to one in 417,000.56 
Significantly, the only documented cases of apparent trans-
mission from a health care worker to a patient occurred in Dr. 
Acer's office, where compliance with infection control proce-
dures was lax.57 Supporters of mandatory HIV testing for 
health care workers speculate that many more patients have 
been infected by HIV-infected health care workers but look-
51. CDC, Investigations of Persons Treated, supra note 1, at 329. 
52. Audrey S. Rogers et al., Investigation of Potential HIV Transmission to the 
Patients of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795, 1799 (1993). 
53. C. Fordham von Reyn et al., Absence of HIV Transmission from an Infected 
Orthopedic Surgeon: A 13-Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807, 1810 (1993); see 
also ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 183-84 (containing testimony of Dr. 
Howard J. Hess, who suggested that the risk of HIV transmission in health care 
settings "is actually very small"). 
54. Gordon M. Dickinson et al., Absence of HIV Transmission from an Infected 
Dentist to His Patients, 269 JAMA 1802, 1805 (1993). 
55. Id. at 1804. 
56. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Open 
Meeting on the Risks of Transmission of Blood-borne Pathogens to Patients During 
Invasive Procedures (Feb. 21-22, 1991) (transcript at 52, on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
57. See CDC, Transmission of HIV Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 21, 25. 
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hack studies have not identified these patients.58 They main-
tain that the Acer cluster presented the sole opportunity for 
DNA sequencing of both a health care worker's and a patient's 
strand of HIV, thereby resulting in the only finding that a 
health care worker infected his patients. It is not true, 
however, that other look-back studies did not perform DNA 
sequencing. Most look-back studies performed DNA sequencing 
on infected patients for whom other risk factors had been elimi-
nated. 59 To date, no cases of transmission of HIV from health 
care worker to patient, other than those in the Acer cluster, 
have been documented.60 
D. Universal Precautions and the CDC's Response to the 
Acer Cluster to Reduce Risk of Transmission in 
the Health Care Setting 
On July 12, 1991, partly in response to the publicity sur-
rounding the Acer incident, the CDC published guidelines for 
preventing the transmission of Hepatitis B virus (HBV) and 
HIV from health care workers to patients.61 The guidelines may 
be summarized as follows: 
1. All health care workers should adhere to "universal pre-
cautions"62 in the use and disposal of needles and other 
sharp instruments, and comply with current guidelines for 
disinfection of reusable devices used in invasive proce-
dures; 
58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
61. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3. Another important set of guidelines on this 
topic are the guidelines of the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration issued 
December 6, 1991. See Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910 (1994). These guidelines have been upheld as a reasonable regulatory response. 
See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 172 (1993). This Article will focus on the CDC's guidelines because they are the 
most widely known. 
62. "Universal precautions" refer to guidelines issued by the CDC to promote 
infection control. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3. The CDC's system treats all human 
blood and body fluids as if known to be infectious for HIV, HBV, or other blood-borne 
pathogens. Universal precautions involve the appropriate use of protective barriers, 
needles, disposal methods, handwashing, education, and record keeping employed in 
a routine system such that infections are controlled and transmission risks are mini-
mized or eliminated. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 2. 
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2. There is no scientific basis to restrict the practice of an· 
HIV-infected worker who performs invasive procedures 
that are not identified as "exposure-prone," provided uni-
versal precautions are practiced, because there is no risk 
of infecting patients in non-invasive procedures;63 
3. HIV-infected workers should not perform "exposure-prone" 
procedures unless they have sought authority from a 
medical review . panel and have obtained the informed 
consent of the patient; 
4. "Exposure-prone" procedures should be more specifically 
identified by medical, surgical, dental, and other profes-
sional organizations and institutions at which the proce-
dures are performed; 
5. Mandatory testing of health care workers is not recom-
mended because the current assessment of the risk of 
transmission does not support the intrusion and costs 
attendant to testing; 
6. Compliance with the CDC's recommendations can be in-
creased through education, training, and confidentiality 
safeguards. Notification to patients of a possible HIV 
exposure and follow-up studies should be done by public 
health officials on a case-by-case basis, after taking into 
account the specific risks.64 
While only advisory, the CDC Guidelines have subsequently 
been adopted into law by many jurisdictions. Congress mandat-
ed in 1992 that states adopt the CDC Guidelines or equivalent 
protections before October 1992.65 Some states have adopted 
the CDC Guidelines, but other states have certified that they 
are developing their own equivalent guidelines. 66 The response 
of medical organizations was also divided, with many organiza-
tions strongly supporting the CDC's recommendations that all 
63. Id. at 5. 
64. Id. at 5-6. 
65. Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-
2 (Supp. V 1993)) (requiring states to establish guidelines for the prevention of 
transmission of HIV and HBV during invasive procedures). 
66. See Phillips et al., supra note 30, at 857. 
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health care workers adhere to universal precautions,6? but with 
a few organizations opposing them.68 The National Commission 
on AIDS also opposed mandatory testing of health care workers 
and urged that any restrictions on the practice of health care 
workers should be based on an assessment of the individual 
health care worker's professional competence, ability to comply 
with universal precautions and any previous transmission of 
other blood-borne infections.69 
The CDC supported voluntary HIV tests of health care 
workers who perform exposure-prone procedures. Many health 
care organizations and experts, including the CDC, have 
rejected mandatory testing of health care workers as an 
appropriate response to concerns over HIV transmission in the 
health care setting.70 Testing a health care worker provides 
information about that worker's HIV status only at a time prior 
to the specific time of testing. Thus, test results may be inaccu-
rate because of false positives or negatives. Test results may 
also be affected by the "window period" between infection and 
the time that the body develops HIV antibodies which would 
be reflected on an AIDS test.71 The reliability of a negative test 
67. See generally ABA, Washington Hearing, supra note 12 (containing testimony 
of representatives of the American Association of Dental Schools, American Medical 
Association, and the Federation of State and Medical Boards); ABA, Chicago Hearing, 
supra note 12 (containing testimony of representatives of the American College of 
Emergency Physicians and the Federation of State Medical Boards). At least one group 
that opposed the CDC Guidelines did so because the guidelines were too restrictive 
of health care workers. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, PREVENTING HIV TRANSMIS-
SION IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS 9 (1992) (stating that the Infectious Disease Society 
of America opposed any restriction on practice by HIV-infected health care workers). 
68. See, e.g .• AMERICAN CoLLEGE OF SURGEONS, STATEMENT ON THE SURGEON AND 
HIV INFECTION 28, 30-31 (1991). Although this statement agrees with the CDC that 
health care workers should comply with "universal precautions,n the statement's 
recommendations vary drastically in content from the CDC's. See id. For one perspec-
tive from abroad, see Lynn M. Peterson, Book Review, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450-51 
(1993) (reviewing THE IMPACT OF HIV ON SURGICAL PRACTICE (J.P.S. Cochrane & C. 
Wastell eds., 1992) and noting that England's Royal College of Surgeons believes that 
HIV-infe.cted surgeons should never perform invasive procedures): 
69. NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, supra note 67, at 22-23, 29. The National 
Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome was established by Pub. L. 
No. 100-607, §§ 241-249, 102 Stat. 3048, 3104-08 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300cc app. (1988). 
70. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 62. 
71. This Article uses the term "window periodn to describe the period from six 
weeks to three months from the time of infection until the appearance of HIV antibod-
ies. See JOSEPH T. PAINTER, AMERICAN MEDICAL AsS'N, REPORT OF THE BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES: HIV AND PHYSICIANS 6 (1991), reprinted in ABA, Chicago Briefing Book, 
supra note 12, pt. 5. During this "window period," an infected person would not 
produce HIV antibodies and an HIV test would be negative although the virus would 
7 48 University of Michigan Journal of Law 'Reform [VOL. 28:4 
result also could be affected by subsequent opportunities for 
exposure. Finally, negative test results could lead to the 
unjustified relaxation of and decreased dependence on univer-
sal precautions. 
E. Conclusions 
In light of the infinitesimal risk72 that a health care worker 
will transmit HIV to a patient, the AIDS Coordinating Com-
mittee (the Committee) recommends that states adopt legisla-
tion which allows health care workers infected with HIV or 
HBV to continue their jobs unless unusual circumstances 
surrounding their medical practices or procedures demon-
strably pose a significant risk to patients. For infected health 
care workers who perform exposure-prone procedures, an 
expert review panel should advise the worker on the circum-
stances under which they may continue to perform these 
invasive procedures. Based on our hearings and based on the 
reaction of medical groups to the CDC's guidelines, the Com-
mittee believes that voluntary HIV testing and voluntary use 
of expert review panels are most effective, particularly because 
a voluntary system more likely will encourage health care 
workers to have an HIV test and learn about their HIV status. 
Armed with that knowledge, the health care provider can take 
appropriate precautions to minimize even the tiny risk of HIV 
transmission in the health care setting. 
II. HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
Courts that have considered the issue have reached different 
results as to whether a hospital or other health care employer 
be present. Id. Periodic retesting provides greater assurance that a negative HIV test 
result is correct. See Larry Gostin, The HIV Infected Health Care Professional: Public 
Policy, Discrimination and Patient Safety, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 303, 307 
(1990); Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in 
AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PuBLIC 18, 32 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 
1993). 
72. See supra Part l.B-C. 
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may terminate a health care worker's employment on account 
of that worker's HIV status.73 Not surprisingly, a court's opin-
ion about the likelihood that an infected health care worker 
would transmit HIV to a patient significantly influences the 
court's decision on the merits of the health care worker's 
employment dispute. Such variation is troubling because the 
facts about the low risk of HIV transmission from health care 
worker to patient do not change significantly from case to case. 
Rather, what varies is the court's own measure of how "signifi-
cant" the risk of HIV transmission is. The significance of the 
risk of transmitting a disease is an important factor in deter-
mining an employee's protection from adverse employment 
decisions under current Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, 
the legal system should incorporate more uniformly medical 
knowledge about the risks of HIV transmission from health 
care workers to patients and should protect the employment 
rights of health care professionals.74 
A. Statutory Protections of 
HIV-Infected Employees 
Two federal statutes protect HIV-infected employees, in-
cluding health care workers, from employment discrimination. 
The Rehabilitation Act of 197375 prohibits entities that receive 
federal financial assistance, entities that have federal con-
tracts, and the federal government itself, from discriminating 
against an "otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... 
solely by reason of her or his disability."76 Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA)77 prohibits discrimination by 
private employers against a "qualified individual with a 
73. Compare Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(upholding the hospital's decision to bar Dr. Scoles from performing surgery at any 
ofits hospitals without proof that his patients knew of his HIV status, in part because 
the doctor had not established that he did not pose a "significant risk" to his patients) 
with Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992) (striking down as 
discriminatory the defendant's decision to withdraw an offer of employment as a fire 
fighter to an HIV positive individual, in spite of a medical determination that having 
HIV rendered plaintiff unfit for such work). 
74. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987). 
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
76. Id. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. V 1993). 
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disability'' who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the desired employment 
position.78 Title II of the ADA prohibits state and local govern-
ments from discriminating against qualified individuals with 
disabilities.79 Title III of the ADA prohibits private businesses, 
including hospitals, from discriminating against individuals 
with disabilities in the provision of goods or services, including 
the provision of privileges. 80 
Although the two statutes contain different terms, the ele-
ments necessary to establish a prima facie claim under each 
law are essentially identical. An HIV-infected individual 
alleging discriminatory treatment must demonstrate that she: 
(1) has a "handicap" or a "disability" within the applicable 
statute;81 (2) was otherwise qualified for the position;82 and (3) 
was discriminated against on the basis of the handicap or 
disability.83 In 1992, Congress added a provision to section 501 
of the Rehabilitation Act providing that the standards of the 
ADA would apply to all section 501 claims.84 
1. Definitions of Disability Under the ADA-HIV infection 
is a covered disability under the ADA. To receive protection 
·from the federal statutes, a health care worker must have a 
"disability," as defined by the relevant statutes. The worker 
must fit into one of three general definitions: (1) have a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more· 
78. Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112. The ADA covers private employers with 15 or more 
employees. Id. § 12111{5){A). 
79. Id. § 12131. 
80. Id. § 12182. 
81. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993). Because the 
definitions of "handicap" and "disability" are almost identical, this Part will use the 
term "disability" exclusively, even when referring to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
82. 29 u.s.c. § 794 (1988); 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8). 
83. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See generally Robert B. Fitzpatrick & 
E. Anne Benaroya, Applying the Americans with Disabilities Act to AIDS, ALl-ABA 
COURSE MATERIALS J., Apr. 1992, at 79 {suggesting steps for employers to take in 
order to avoid AIDS-related conflicts in the workplace); Chai R. Feldblum, Workplace 
Issues: HIV and Discrimination, in AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 
271 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (arguing that the ADA will 
extend protection against workplace discrimination to persons with HIV). 
84. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, sec. 503(b), 
§ 501, 106 Stat. 4344, 4424 {codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (Supp. V 1993)). The 1992 
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act state: "The standards used to determine 
whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging nonaffirmative action 
employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 .... " 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (Supp. 
v 1993). 
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major life activities; (2) be regarded as having such an im-
pairment; or (3) have a record of such an impairment.85 
With respect to physical impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity, regulations promulgated by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other 
government agencies define a physical impairment as "[a]ny 
physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more 
of the ... body systems ... hemic and lymphatic."86 Major life 
activities are defined in EEOC87 and Department of Justice 
(DOJ)88 regulations in a nonexhaustive list as including func-
tions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working. The DOJ concluded that HIV infection substantially 
limits an infected individual's major life activities such as 
normal procreation, freedom from the fear of how the infection 
will effect a fetus, and forming intimate personal relation-
ships. 89 The DOJ Guidance to the ADA regulations repeats this 
conclusion regarding HIV infection.90 The EEOC also has 
concluded that HIV infection substantially limits a major life 
activity and thus falls within the first prong pf the definition 
of a disability.91 
In claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have 
agreed with the premise that individuals with AIDS and 
asymptomatic HIV infection are individuals with a handicap.92 
85. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993). 
These three statutory definitions are alternative definitions. Thus, an individual need 
satisfy only one of the three alternatives to meet the statutory definition. See 29 
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1995) (Health and Human Services Regulations); 45 
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1994) (EEOC regulations). 
87. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994). 
88. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1994). 
89. Justice Department Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the 1973 
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Persons, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Fair Empl. Prac.) 
No. 641, at 405:4, 405:6-:7 (Sept. 27, 1988). 
90. See Department of Justice Guidance, 28 C.F.R. app. § 36.104 (1995). The 
Department of Justice inserted the phrase "symptomatic or asymptomaticn before the 
term "HIV diseasen in order to clarify that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV 
infection are covered. See id. 
91. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995) ("Other impairments ... such as HIV infection, are 
inherently substantially limiting. n). 
92. See, e.g., Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179 (11th 
Cir. 1991); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988); Chalk v. United 
States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. 
Mass. 1991); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 723 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Cal. 
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Individuals with AIDS and asymptomatic HIV infection have 
also been permitted to state claims as individuals with disabili-
ties under the ADA.93 
The third category of disability under the statutes-having 
a record of an impairment-protects individuals who have been 
misclassified as HIV-positive in, for example, educational, 
medical, or employment files. 94 It very much resembles the 
second category-being regarded as having an impairment-in 
that it protects a person from discriminatory animus even if 
the discriminator makes a factual error about whether the 
person is HIV positive.95 Also, individuals who do not have 
AIDS and are not HIV-infected are protected even if they 
merely fit an employer's stereotype of the type of health care 
worker who might be HIV-infected. For example, a gay man 
who is falsely believed to be HIV-infected is nonetheless 
covered by the ADA if discriminated against in employment 
because he is perceived to be HIV-infected.96 
2. The Direct Threat and Significant Risk Test-When 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ,97 it 
added a provision to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
stating that persons with "contagious diseases or infections" 
are not covered under section 504 if they pose a "direct threat 
to the health or. safety of other individuals."98 The members of 
Congress who introduced this provision explained that it was 
designed to codify the standard set in School Board v. Arline.99 
1989), aff d in part and vacated in part, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. 
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
93. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 866 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1994); United 
States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1994). 
94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1995). Such individuals could also argue that they 
fall under the second prong of the definition of disability-protecting those "regarded 
as" having an impairment. 
95. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (1995). 
96. State laws often have analogous definitions of "disability," which have been 
used to protect people perceived to be HIV-infected. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 
486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff without HIV could still bring 
suit under the Michigan Handicap Civil Rights Act where her employer's discrimina-
tion was motivated by the erroneous perception that plaintiff was HIV-positive). 
97. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
98. § 9, 102 Stat. at 31-32 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (Supp. V 
1993)). 
99. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S1739 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) 
(colloquy statement of Sen. Harkin) ("'A person who poses a significant risk of com-
municating an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise 
qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.'" 
(quoting School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987)). 
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Arline held that, for individuals who pose a significant health 
risk to others in the workplace and who have contagious 
diseases, these individuals are not otherwise qualified for the 
jobs they seek to hold "if reasonable accommodation will not 
eliminate that risk."100 Several members of Congress also 
explained that the specific reference to contagious infections 
in the new provision was to reaffirm coverage of people with 
asymptomatic HIV infection under section 504, unless they 
posed a direct threat to others. 101 
In Arline, the Supreme Court ruled that four factors must be 
analyzed to determine whether a person with a contagious 
disease posed a "significant risk" to others: 
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), 
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infec-
tious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential 
harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease 
will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of 
harm. 102 
The risk assessment must also include findings on whether the 
employer could reasonably accommodate an individual who is 
infected with a contagious illness.103 The Sup~eme Court noted 
that "courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical 
judgments of public health officials"104 when determining 
whether an individual infected with a contagious illness poses 
a "significant risk" to others in the workplace. 105 
100. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16. 
101. See 134 CONG. REC. H574 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Owens); 
134 CONG. REC. H573 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss); 134 CONG. 
REC. E487 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hoyer). 
102. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. 
103. Id. Statements by sponsors during the floor debate of the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act indicate a legislative intent to codify the approach to risk assessment 
outlined in Arline. See 134 CONG. REC. H575 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of 
Rep. Waxman) (noting that "some Members want the holding [of Arline] codified in 
statute, and I will not oppose doing so"). But see 134 CONG. REC. H580 (daily ed. Mar. 
2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (urging that the House should reject the bill 
because members had not had an opportunity to debate the implications of codifying 
the Arline decision). 
104. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. 
105. See id. at 287 n.16. The Supreme Court also noted that "[t)his case does not 
present, and we do not address, the question whether courts should also defer to the 
reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has relied." 
Id. at 288 n.18. 
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Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, which does not provide a 
statutory definition of "direct threat,"106 the ADA explicitly 
defines a "direct threat" to mean "a significant risk to the 
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by rea-
sonable accommodation. "107 The legislative history to this 
section indicates congressional intent to adopt the Arline 
approach and to establish a strict showing of actual risk. As 
the House Education and Labor Committee Report explained: 
[F]or a person with a currently contagious disease or infec-
tion to constitute a direct threat to the health or safety or 
[sic] others, the person must pose a significant risk of 
transmitting the infection to others in the workplace which 
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.108 
The EEOC, following the legislative history, likewise explained 
that the significant risk test is intended to be substantial. The 
EEOC's ADA regulations require that the disability pose a 
significant risk of substantial harm.109 
B. Judicial Decisions Restricting Employment 
of HIV-Infected Health Care Workers 
Courts and agencies deciding cases concerning continued 
employment of HIV-infected health care providers have as-
sessed the significance of the risk that these workers pose to 
their patients in varying ways. This variation is, of itself, 
troubling because the scientific facts concerning the risk of 
transmission posed by an HIV-infected health care worker 
using proper infection control procedures do not change. As the 
following cases demonstrate, stereotype, misunderstanding, 
and fear dominate the decisions in which courts have restricted 
the employment of HIV-positive health care workers while 
adherence to the medical and scientific facts more often pre-
vails in the decisions permitting HIV-positive health care 
workers to maintain their employment responsibilities. 
106. 29 u.s.c. § 706 (1988). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
108. H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1990) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 358-59. 
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995). 
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This Article will address decisions concerning employment, 
credentialling, and students, with the relevant cases on each 
topic discussed in chronological order. 
1. Employees-The first court case to address the issue of 
an HIV-infected health care worker upheld a hospital's decision 
to fire a health care worker who failed to report his HIV test 
results to the hospital. In Lechelt v. Board of Commissioners 
of Hospital District No. 1, 110 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that the nurse failed to prove he had 
been fired solely because of a perceived handicap. m Rather, the 
court concluded, the nurse had been fired because he had failed 
to submit HIV test results in compliance with hospital policy. 112 
The court also concluded that the hospital was justified, based 
on the CDC guidelines in effect at the time, in requiring testing 
of all health care workers who might pose any risk of exposure 
to patients.113 
More recently, the Fifth Circuit held that a hospital did not 
violate the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when it reassigned a 
surgical assistant who was HIV-positive to a purchasing 
department position with no patient contact. In Bradley v. 
University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,114 the court 
defined the issue as whether the plaintiff was "otherwise 
qualified" to continue in his employment as a surgical techni-
cian despite his HIV status.115 The court stated that plaintiff 
Bradley's position as a surgical assistant required him to 
handle sharp instruments and to come in direct contact with 
open wounds, and the court noted that Bradley had suffered 
five needle puncture wounds while on the job. 116 The court 
concluded that while the CDC had characterized the risk of 
transmitting HIV from an infected health care worker to. a 
110. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990). 
111. Id. at 826. 
112. Id.; cf Doe by Lavery v. United States Attorney Gen., 814 F. Supp. 844, 848 
. (N.D .. Cal. 1992) (holding that the FBI did not violate. the Rehabilitation Act by 
discontinuing its contract with a physician with AIDS because the physician would 
not provide information about transmission risks and prevention), rev'd, 62 F.3d 1424 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
113. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 830. The most recent CDC guidelines, of course, do not 
call for mandatory testing of all health care workers. In addition, under the ADA, the 
statutory language that an individual must prove he or she was discriminated against 
"solely" on the basis of disability was deleted. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993); 
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 85, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 367-68. 
114. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994). 
115. Id. at 924. 
116. Id. 
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patient as small, the risk was "not so low as to nullify the 
catastrophic consequences of an accident."117 
In December 1994, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a hospital's refusal 
to allow an HIV-positive surgeon to perform surgery did not 
violate either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. In Scoles u. 
Mercy Health Corp., 118 defendant Mercy Health refused to allow 
the plaintiff, Dr. Scoles, to perform invasive procedures at any 
ofits hospitals without documentation stating that his patients 
were aware of his HIV status. 119 In addition, each patient had 
to consent to having Dr. Scoles perform their procedure. 120 In 
denying both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court 
found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was not 
a "direct threat" or a "significant risk" to his patients. 121 In so 
finding, the court dismissed plaintiff's argument that the risk 
of transmission of HIV was low, and instead held that "knowl-
edge of the probability of HIV transmission from surgeon to 
patient is very limited."122 The court was heavily influenced by 
the fact that "the disease ... is almost always fatal." 123 Clearly, 
fear of HIV dominated the court's view of the case. 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit recently held that a neurosurgical 
resident could be fired because _he was HIV-positive, effectively 
dismissing the resident's claims under the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA. Doe u. University of Maryland Medical System 
Corp. 124 involved a neurosurgical resident whose HIV status 
was discovered in the third year of a six-year residency train-
ing. After Dr. Doe refused to transfer to a non-surgical residen-
cy, the University of Maryland Medical System Corporation 
(UMMSC) terminated him from its residency program. 125 In 
upholding his termination, the Fourth Circuit rejected Dr. 
Doe's argument that the risk of his transmitting HIV to one of 
his patients was "so infinitesimal that it cannot, regardless of 
the degree of harm involved, be considered a significant 
risk."126 While the court occasionally stated that it based its 
117. Id. 
118. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
119. Id. at 767. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 772. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995). 
125. Id. at 1262-63. 
126. Id. at 1266. 
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holding on a risk of transmission from "exposure-prone proce-
dures,"127 further analysis of the case makes it clear that the 
court concluded that Dr. Doe posed a significant health and 
safety risk because the "risk of percutaneous injury can never 
be eliminated."128 The court never identified a single case of 
surgeon to patient transmission, however, even in exposure-
prone procedures.129 The Fourth Circuit even went so far as to 
state that "extra precautions," over and above the universal 
precautions already required by the hospital's medical review 
board, were inadequate because "some measure of risk will 
always exist."13° Clearly, the court was not evaluating signif-
icant risk as required by School Board v. Arline, 131 but rather 
allowed the hospital to terminate Dr. Doe unless he presented 
an absolute guarantee against the possibility that he would 
transmit HIV. 
The University Medical System case is particularly disturbing 
because the hospital rejected a recommendation of its own 
panel of experts on blood-borne pathogens that Dr. Doe could 
safely continue a neurosurgical practice as long as he strictly 
followed proper infection-control procedures. 132 The panel 
suggested minimal restrictions on Dr. Doe's ability to perform 
surgical procedures and did not recommend that he notify his 
patients of his HIV status prior to· performing surgery on 
them. 133 Such is precisely the type of informed medical judg-
ment which the CDC Guidelines recommend that an employer 
obtain. 134 The fact that the hospital rejected the expert medical 
panel's judgment is disturbing, perhaps dwarfed only by the 
fact that the court upheld the hospital's opinion. In effect, the 
court placed its own judgment ahead of that of medical profes-
sionals135-in contravention of the Supreme Court's admonition 
127. Id. at 1267. 
128. Id. at 1266 (citing Bradley v. University M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 
922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994)). 
129. Id. ("Although there may presently be no documented case of surgeon-to-
patient transmission, such transmission clearly is possible."). 
130. Id. 
131. See supra Part 11.A.2. 
132. Id. at 1262. 
133. Id. 
134. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 142. 
135. The Fourth Circuit noted that it deferred to the medical judgment of the 
hospital as a whole, not to that of the medical review panel. When the hospital 
rejected the medical review panel's findings, the court then disregarded those findings 
as well. University Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266. 
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in Arline to defer to reasonable medical judgment. 136 In fact, 
the court seems to conclude that, as long as the hospital 
demonstrated no intent to hurt Dr. Doe, the hospital's actions 
are justified regardless of whether Dr. Doe has a .protected 
disability. 137 
The courts in Lechelt, Bradley, Scoles, and University Medical 
System relied heavily on the presumption that, although the 
risk of transmission of HIV from a health care worker to a 
patient is quite low, an infected health care worker could still 
be considered "not qualified" because the potential outcome of 
the risk, if it occurred, would be catastrophic. This analysis, 
however, contradicts the legislative history of the ADA and the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance to the ADA which specifically 
require that an employer prove that an individual's disability 
will pose a "significant risk of substantial harm."138 Under the 
ADA approach, therefore, it would not suffice for one part of 
the equation, such as the substantial nature of the harm, to be 
high. Rather, there must be some showing to demonstrate that 
the first part of the equation, the significance of the risk, is 
also high. 139 
In addition, these courts have improperly placed the burden 
of demonstrating an absence of risk on the infected health care 
worker. In Scoles, for example, the court found that Dr. Scoles 
had failed to establish that he did not pose a significant risk 
to his patients. 140 Under the ADA, the presumption should be 
reversed and rest in favor of the health care worker, because 
a worker will not transmit HIV in most cases. The ADA 
provides that a person should be protected from adverse 
employment decisions, unless the employer can demonstrate 
that the worker presents a significant risk of substantial 
harm. 141 
136. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). We believe that the Fourth 
Circuit's conclusion is erroneous because the CDC and Arline recommend deference to 
medical expertise-not to the business-based decisions of administrators and lawyers 
who may be motivated by fear, among other factors, of lawsuits by patients. Id. 
137. University Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266 ("[T]here is nothing in the record 
to indicate that UMMSC acted with anything other than the best interests of its 
patients and Dr. Doe at heart."). Of course, discriminatory animus is not an element 
of an ADA or Rehabilitation Act case. Id. at 1264-65. 
138. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 358-59. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1995) (emphasis added). 
139. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r). 
140. Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r). 
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Other cases under the Rehabilitation Act have resulted in 
findings in favor of the HIV-infected person. In these cases, the 
courts have focused on the low probability of HIV transmission 
to a patient. For example, in 1992, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) ordered the termination of federal 
financial assistance to the Westchester County Medical Center 
because of the center's continuing discrimination against a 
pharmacist infected with HIV. 142 The HHS Appeals Board held 
that the risk of the pharmacist transmitting HIV through the 
preparation of the pharmaceutical product at issue was "so 
small as not to be measurable."143 The agency relied on those 
studies which found that non-invasive procedures, such as the 
preparation of pharmaceutical products, pose no risk for the 
transmission of HIV.144 The agency carefully examined the 
pharmacist's job to determine whether he performed any 
"exposure-prone invasive procedures" as identified by the CDC 
and found that the tasks performed by the pharmacist fell 
outside those exposure-prone procedures. 145 
The same type of analysis was used by the court in John Doe 
v. District of Columbia. 146 The District of Columbia's Fire 
Department withdrew an offer of employment to the plaintiff 
because of a medical determination that his HIV-positive 
status rendered him unfit to work as a fire fighter. 147 The 
district court found the fir.e department's conduct discrimi-
natory and ordered the reinstatement of Doe in a fire fighting 
position, back pay with interest, compensatory damages of 
$25,000, and attorney fees and court costs.148 
To reach its decision, the court scrutinized the protective 
gear and equipment used on the job by fire fighters. 149 Based 
on expert testimony that the risk of blood-to-blood transmission 
by a fire fighter on the job was "remote," the court conclµded 
there was "no measurable risk" that Doe would transmit the 
142. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., [1991-1994 Transfer Binder] 
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 'I 5340, at 6108 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Apr. 20, 
1992). 
143. Id. at 6119. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. 796 F. Supp. 559, 568-69 (D.D.C. 1992). 
147. Id. at 566. 
148. Id. at 573-74. 
149. The court noted that a fire fighter's helmet, hood, "bunker coat," "bunker 
pants," gloves, "bunker boots," self-contained breathing apparatus and emergency 
medical kit provided a barrier for the transmission of HIV. Id. at 561-62. 
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virus to other fire fighters or the public during the performance 
of fire fighting duties. 150 The court gave great deference to the 
medical judgments of public health officials on the identifiable 
risk of transmitting the HIV virus while employed in the health 
care industry. For example, the court relied on CDC statistics 
which estimate that the risk of a health care worker communi-
cating the HIV virus on the job ranged between 0.3% and 0.5%. 
The court stated that it was "join[ing] other courts that have 
refused to regard the theoretical or remote possibility of trans-
mission of HIV as a basis of excluding HIV-infected persons 
from employment or educational opportunities."151 The same 
court also held in a subsequent case that a fire fighter infected 
with Hepatitis B virus (HBV) would not be a "direct threat" 
when performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.152 For this 
reason, the employer's conduct in restricting the fire fighter 
~iolated the Rehabilitation Act. 153 
Under the Rehabilitation Act, most courts have appropriately 
recognized that the severity of the consequences of transmitting 
HIV is, as a matter oflaw, insufficient to find an HIV-infected 
individual unqualified for a job if the risk of transmission 
through occupational contact is incredibly small. Courts that 
overemphasize the consequences of transmission of HIV dero.: 
gate from their statutory duty. As noted in the legislative 
history of the ADA 154 and the EEOC's regulations, 155 Congress 
and the Executive did not expect that "any'' risk of a catastroph-
ic outcome sufficed to justify employment discrimination. 
Accordingly, they provided a test for significant risk. A risk 
which is considered extremely unlikely to occur should not be 
termed a "significant risk," even if the consequences are cata-
strophic. 
2. Credentialling-Hospitals' credentialling decisions are 
also subject to antidiscrimination statutes. Two types of creden-
tials are often essential to a physician's ability to practice 
medicine: (1) medical staff membership and associated clinical 
privileges at one or more hospitals, and (2) membership on one 
150. Id. at 564. 
151. Id. at 569. 
152. Roe v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 563, 590 (D.D.C. 1993), uacated, 25 
F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
153. Id. 
154. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 108, at 76, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 358-59. 
155. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1995) (defining "direct threat"). 
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or more managed care panels, such as the provider directory of 
a health maintenance organization (HMO). 
Coverage of credentialling decisions exists in a variety of 
provisions within the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, for example, has been interpreted 
by courts to apply to all actions taken by a hospital that receives 
Medicare or Medicaid funding. 156 In addition, Title III of the 
ADA explicitly prohibits hospitals from discriminating on the 
basis of disability in granting hospital privileges.157 Title I of the 
ADA applies to medical staff members who call themselves 
independent contractors if such personnel are considered "em-
ployees" under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 158 
In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 159 a case 
brought under New Jersey's disability antidiscrimination law, 
the court upheld a hospital policy prohibiting HIV-infected 
health care providers from performing "any activity," including 
surgical procedures, "'that creates a risk of transmission of the 
disease to others."'160 The hospital restricted Dr. Behringer's 
surgical privileges after it learned that he was diagnosed with 
AIDS.161 The court upheld the restrictions based on its findings 
that patients faced two possible risks if Dr. Behringer operat-
ed on them-the risk of becoming infected with HIV and the 
risk of simple exposure to Dr. Behringer's blood, which may 
then subject a patient to "months or even years of continued 
HIV testing."162 The court's analysis did not consider whether 
the minimal possibility of actual transmission of HIV to a pa-
tient sufficed to cause Dr. Behringer's HIV status to rise to the 
level of "significant risk" required by the ADA.163 
156. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Miss. Regional Medical Ctr., 765 
F.2d 1278, 1289 (5th Cir.), amended, 777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1142 (1986); United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1040-41 (5th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 
599 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979), affd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir.) (1981). 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
158. See Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 76~7 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1013 (1989); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 
765 F. Supp. 461, 468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Mousavi v. Beebe Hosp., 674 F. Supp. 145, 
149-50 (D. Del. 1987), aff d, 853 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1988). 
159. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). 
160. Id. at 1275 (quoting the hospital's policy). The court decided that "the 
physician must make reasonable disclosure of the information and those risks which 
a reasonably prudent patient would consider material." Id. at 1278. 
161. Id. at 1257-60. 
162. Id. at 1279. 
163. But see Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(denying surgical privileges to HIV-positive surgeon because of fatal nature of 
AIDS, despite uncertainty about degree of risk to patients). 
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In addition to the antidiscrimination legislation, tort liability 
exists for the hospital or managed care plan that negligently 
credentials a physician who is truly hazardous to a patient. 164 
It is unclear whether the risk of tort liability should allow a 
hospital or managed care panel to require a physician to pres-
ent evidence of HIV negativity. In contrast to most private 
sector employment decisions, credentialling decisions generally 
are made under an explicit set of procedures and criteria, 
which the credentialling body by contract must follow. 
Credentialling procedures are designed to ensure that the 
practitioner furnishes high quality care and has good clinical 
judgment and technical skills.165 According to these standards, 
the credentialling institution, the hospital in Behringer, is 
entitled to information about a practitioner's health status 
before granting or renewing credentials.166 This requirement is 
consistent with hospital infection control procedures that 
generally require affirmative disclosure of diseases that may 
be communicable.167 
In the context of HIV and AIDS, such disclosure require-
ments do not seem to bear any rational relationship to the 
harm which a hospital attempts to avoid. A medical staff seeks 
to avoid the risk of transmission of HIV-mere status as an 
HIV-positive practitioner does not necessarily do any damage. 
A better credentialling standard would focus on the individu-
al's competence, and in particular on the individual's ability to 
satisfy the technical infection control procedures of the institu-
tion or medical plan. As noted above, adherence to infection 
control procedures is most relevant to the risk of transmission. 
Exclusion of a practitioner merely based on HIV-status is 
overprotective because many experts believe that an HIV-
positive doctor who adheres to universal precautions and does 
not perform invasive procedures poses an infinitesimal risk of 
HIV transmission to their patients. It is also dangerous to 
ignore the quality of infection control procedures because a 
164. For a related discussion of tort liability in risk determination and mandato-
ry testing of health care workers, see Mark D. Johnson, HIV Testing of Health Care 
Workers: Conflict Between the Common Law and the Centers for Disease Control, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 479 (1993). 
165. See, e.g.' JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 
AMH: ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 54 (1993) ("The criteria are designed 
to assure the medical staff and governing body that patients will receive quality 
care."). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 37-38. 
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health care worker who is infected with HIV, but who has not 
yet seroconverted,168 could receive credentials and still pose a 
risk of infection if he fails to adhere to uniform precautions. 
The ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee believes that a health 
care worker should be denied credentials based on HIV-posi-
tive status only if the person fails to adhere to appropriate 
infection controls and universal precautions. 
3. Students-In at least one instance, a court limited an 
HIV-infected student's entry into work in a health care set-
ting. In Doe v. Washington University, 169 the court upheld the 
university's decision to expel a third-year dental student who 
was HIV-positive.170 The court found the decision to be "aca-
demic" and not "medical" and thus used a less restrictive 
standard of review to determine if the university's expulsion of 
the student was discriminatory. 171 In reviewing the "academic" 
decision to disenroll the plaintiff, the court stated it would not 
overturn the university's decision unless it constituted "such 'a 
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not 
actually exercise professional judgment.' "172 
The court deferred to the university's decision, in large part 
because that decision was made after conferring with more 
than forty professionals, considering medical information, and 
balancing the individual rights at stake. 173 The court observed: 
"To permit even an occasional death to occur because of a 
failure to scrupulously guard the safety of patients would 
appear to be morally unacceptable and contrary to the fiducia-
ry responsibilities of the medical profession.''174 Although the 
court declined to address the broader question of whether 
HIV-positive health care workers should perform invasive 
pfocedures, it reached the narrower question of whether the 
university properly made this "academic" decision. 175 Within 
this narrower issue, the court upheld the university's conclu-
sion that the student posed a significant risk to patients whom 
168. For a definition of "seroconversion," see supra note 24. See also supra note 
71 and accompanying text (describing the "window period" between infection and 
appearance of HIV antibodies). 
169. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
170. Id. at 630. 
171. Id. at 631. 
172. Id. (citation omitted). 
173. Id. at 634. 
174. Id. at 633-34. 
175. Id. at 634. 
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he treated while completing the university's requirement of 
1021 clinical procedure hours. 176 
The analysis of the Washington University court is flawed 
because it focuses on the severity of harm caused by AIDS, 
rather than on the insignificant risk of transmission in a medi-
cal setting. HIV-positive dentists can safely practice dentistry 
if they follow proper infection control practices. All dental 
students should adhere to those same infection control stan-
dards because many dental students who are not known to 
carry a blood disease may nonetheless carry HIV or HBV. 
Moreover, it appears highly questionable whether the univer-
sity and the court applied the proper standard of review 
because the decision to expel the student based on his HIV-
positive status could be considered as much medical as 
academic. 
Educational decisions do, however, present distinct issues 
from most employment contexts because issues of academic 
standards are present. It may, for example, have been appro-
priate for the university to refuse enrollment on the grounds. 
that a student cannot adhere to proper infection control proce-
dures in the early periods of her patient care because of her 
lack of experience. However, no scientific justification exists 
for automatically barring HIV-infected students from profes-
sional schools. Such exclusions violate the antidiscrimination 
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, as discussed 
above. 
C. Mandatory HIV-Testing of Health Care Workers 
No restriction has caused more concern or response within 
the health care industry than that of mandatory testing of 
health care workers to determine their HIV status. Courts 
have upheld mandatory HIV testing for fire fighters, para-
medics, and personnel working overseas for the United States 
Department of State.177 In Anonymous Fireman v. City of 
176. Id. at 633-34. 
177. E.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. 
Ohio 1991) (upholding a city's mandatory HIV blood testing policy for fire fighters 
and parmedics because they are "high-risk government employees"); Local 1812, 
American Fed'n ofGov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 
53-54 CD.D.C. 1987) (holding that the likelihood that the plaintiff union would 
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Willoughby, 178 for example, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio applied a strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review and found that protecting the public from the 
contraction and transmission of AIDS constituted a compelling 
governmental interest which justified the intrusion into work-
ers' privacy caused by mandatory testing.179 
In Anonymous Fireman, the court upheld a city's policy of 
requiring mandatory HIV testing of fire fighters and paramedics 
as part of their annual physical examination to determine each 
worker's "fitness to serve."180 The court found mandatory testing 
reasonable based on the compelling governmental interests in: 
(1) maintaining a safe work force, (2) protecting "the public from 
the contraction and transmission of AIDS by fire fighters and 
paramedics," and (3) "[s]topping the spread of the deadly AIDS 
epidemic."181 Mandatory testing "for the sole purpose of obtain-
ing a baseline to determine whether an employee contracted 
AIDS on the job and thereby determine the validity of any 
future worker's compensation claims" was found not to consti-
tute a valid governmental interest.182 The court also held that 
"[m]andatory AIDS testing of employees can be valid only if the 
group of employees involved is at a high risk of contracting 
and/or transmitting AIDS to the public."183 Accordingly, the court 
found that the risk of HIV transmission in the performance of 
duties as a fire fighter or paramedic was "high,"184 and upheld 
the mandatory testing requirement. 185 
prevail was insufficient to justify a preliminary injunction where plaintiff repre-
sented foreign service employees who sought to bar mandatory HIV testing as part 
of medical fitness program). 
178. 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
179. Id. at 402. 
180. Id. at 404. 
181. Id. at 416. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 417. 
185. The Anonymous Fireman court's risk assessment gave great weight to its 
finding that "universal precautions for fire fighters ... are not very practical because 
it is difficult to function wearing all of these garments; it is too much paraphernalia 
[sic] to work efficiently." Id. at 407. Fire fighters and paramedics are, thus, in a higher 
risk occupation than hospital workers because they work in a noncontrolled environ-
ment that renders universal precautions less practical. The court also noted that the 
dangerous "line of work" performed by fire fighters created an increased risk of 
transmission of HIV and of being exposed to blood, bodily secretions, and bodily fluids 
of rescue victims. Id. at 412. The public's interest in preventing, detecting, and 
treating HIV as soon as possible rendered the testing requirement reasonable in the 
eyes of the court. Id. at 418. 
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In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retar-
dation,186 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit struck down a policy requiring employees to be 
tested for HBV and HIV because the policy had "'little, if any, 
effect on preventing the spread of [AIDS] or in protecting the cli-
ents."'187 The court found that employees working with mentally 
retarded clients who sometimes bite and scratch did not pose a 
significant risk of transmitting HIV or HBV.188 The court 
concluded that such a "minuscule" risk of occupational transmis-
sion did not justify mandatory testing.189 
We believe the court's approach in Glover is correct, while the 
analysis in Anonymous Fireman is mistaken. The ABA's policy 
provides that "[e]mployers should not test employees for HIV 
except in those extraordinarily rare instances in which an 
employee's HIV status is relevant to his or her job perfor-
mance,"190 but we are not aware of any occupation, even surgery, 
for which HIV status is relevant to job performance. HIV simply 
is not transmitted casually or through occupational contact, even 
in such circumstances as fire rescue. While fire fighters and 
other emergency medical workers may practice in circumstances 
in which they find it impossible to protect themselves using 
universal precautions, such a situation does not create a signifi-
cant risk to the public-even if the worker is HIV-posi-
tive-because the worker unlikely performs one of the handful 
of invasive procedures conveying any risk of transmission. 
Therefore, as no justification exists for mandatory testing of 
health care workers, no justification exists for such testing of 
fire fighters or other emergency medical technicians. 
D. Conclusions 
A well-reasoned analysis of employment restrictions on HIV-
positive health care workers should start by considering whether 
186. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989). 
187. Id. at 463 (quoting Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 
686 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D. Neb. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 932 (1989)). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 463-64. 
190. See American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 9, 15 (1989). 
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the techniques and practices of the individual worker create a 
· significant risk to patients. The best evidence to date indicates 
that one can practice in every health care occupation without 
posing a risk of HIV transmission to the patient. In settings 
such as surgery or dentistry, in which the transmission of the 
virus to a patient is physically possible, following industry-
standard infection control techniques such as "universal 
precautions" eliminates all significant risk of transmission from 
HIV-positive workers. Moreover, applying industry standards 
to all workers, whether or not they are known to be HIV-
positive, increases safety to patients. Health care providers 
should impose employment restrictions only on workers 
unwilling pr unable to adhere to industry-standard precautions, 
and regulations should focus on adherence to proper infection 
control techniques and practices. 
Ill. HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
AND THEIR PATIENTS 
A. Informed Consent 
It is well-established in every jurisdiction that administration 
of health care, except in emergencies, requires the informed 
consent of the patient.191 Some authorities have extended this 
informed consent doctrine to require that HIV-positive 
practitioners notify their patients of their status.192 
191. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE§ 1.1 (2d 
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994). 
192. For the most recent of these articles, see Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligations 
of HIV-Infected Health Professionals to Inform Patients of Their Serological Status: 
Evolving Theories of Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317 (1994), which appears as 
pl'l.I1; of a symposium on AIDS law and discusses the rapidly emerging legal area of 
mandatory HIV status disclosure by health professionals. LeBlang concluded that "(i]t 
will be particularly important to carefully examine all new developments in state 
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies in an effort to seek additional guidance 
regarding evolving disclosure obligations in this complex and rapidly changing 
environment. n Id. at 330. See also Johnson, supra note 164, at 508-34, 541 (reviewing 
the differences between the CDC Guidelines and "the tort theory of the 'special 
relationship' among [health care workers], medical institutions, and patients,n and 
arguing that the latter "provides a more efficacious framework for hospitals and 
[health care workers] to use in resolving" the problems raised by the transmission of 
HIV in the health care setting); Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R. Derse, HIV-Positive 
Health Care Workers and the Obligation to Disclose: Do Patients Have a Right to 
Know?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 355-56 (1992) (arguing that the "doctrines ofinformed 
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Several courts have allowed patients to sue their doctors 
(especially surgeons) for failure to notify them of the doctor's 
HIV-positive status based on an informed consent theory. 193 In 
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, 194 the court 
observed that a reasonably prudent patient would find the risk 
of exposure to the HIV virus from his physician "material" to 
the decision of whether to have the invasive procedure per-
formed.195 After weighing the rights of the patient to know the 
risks associated with the invasive procedure against the sur-
geon's "individual right to perform an invasive procedure as a 
part of the practice of his profession," the court held that the 
risks created a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" to 
warrant the informed consent of the patient. 196 
Although the court held in favor of the patient's right to 
informed consent, it also found the hospital and the labora-
tory director negligent for failing to take reasonable mea-
sures to protect the confidentiality of an employee/patient 
who has been diagnosed with AIDS.197 The hospital's policies 
for maintaining the privacy of medical records included plac-
ing HIV test results on the chart while simultaneously allow-
ing the entire medical center to have access to the chart. 198 
The court noted that acceptable precautions could include 
securing the chart by limiting access to designated people 
with a "bona-fide need to know" or by excising portions of the 
record that contain HIV-related factors. 199 It is difficult to 
understand how these confidentiality considerations could be 
reconciled with the informed consent requirement that the 
Behringer court imposed. 
consent and fiduciary duty appear to provide the basis for imposing a duty of 
disclosure on an infected health care worker who intends to perform invasive 
procedures"). 
193. E.g., Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Kerins 
v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 
1993), transferred, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 
1993). While on the first appeal, the court in Kerins found that the patient could sue 
his surgeon for damages from emotional distress, that decision was ultimately re-
versed in light of subsequent California Supreme Court precedent. See Kerins, 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 621. 
194. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). 
195. Id. at 1283. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 1273-74. 
198. Id. at 1271. 
199. Id. at 1273. 
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In January 1992, a panel of judges in Pennsylvania allowed 
a lawsuit against two hospitals. 200 One of the claims in that 
case charged the hospitals with failing to inform patients of 
the HIV-positive status201 of an obstetrician-gynecologist 
resident who had performed or assisted in invasive operative 
procedures on 442 patients.202 The claimants alleged that the 
hospitals' duty to provide patients with information that a 
reasonable patient would require to make an informed decision 
includes information concerning the HIV-positive status of the 
providers.203 Likewise, in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.,204 Dr. 
Scoles' hospital initially required that he produce documen-
tation indicating that each patient had given her informed 
consent with full knowledge of Dr. Scoles' HIV status.205 The 
hospital later reduced that requirement slightly to require that 
Dr. Scoles "inform his patients of his HIV status prior to any 
invasive procedure."206 When Dr. Scoles sued the hospital under 
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for restricting his 
staff privileges, the court denied the doctor's claim and found 
for the hospital.207 
More recently, two Maryland patients sued their surgeon's 
estate and his hospital more than one year after their oper-
ations. The patients learned, after the surgeon's death, that the 
doctor had been HIV-positive and knew as much at the time 
of their operations. 208 Ruling for the plaintiffs, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that a physician's duty of care could 
encompass disclosure of his HIV infection, even though the 
probability of HIV transmission is extremely low.209 In different 
contexts, courts have imposed a duty of disclosure on health 
care workers, particularly surgeons, who know they are HIV-
positive and yet continue to operate.210 
200. Wolgemuth v. Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., No. 2694-8-1991 (Pa. C.P. 
Dauphin County Jan. 30, 1992). 
201. Id. at 17. 
202. Id. at 3-4. 
203. Id. 
204. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
205. Id. at 767. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 772. 
208. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993). 
209. Id. at 339. 
210. See also Doe v. United States Attorney Gen., 34 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1994), 
reu'd, 62 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995). This case involved a contract between the United 
States government and a health facility for performing physical examinations on FBI 
agents. Id. at 782. The FBI stopped sending agents to this hospital after the hospital 
770 Univen;ity of Michigan Journal of Law &form [VOL. 28:4 
On the issue of patient notification, the CDC has taken a 
middle position between mandating notification and leaving the 
matter to the discretion of the health care provider. The CDC 
Guidelines do not generally require notifying patients, but they 
recommend that health care workers performing ex-
posure-prone procedures notify patients of their HIV status. 
The CDC Guidelines provide that HIV-infected physicians 
should not perform "exposure-prone invasive procedures" 
without the authority of a medical review panel and the 
informed consent of the patient.211 Similarly, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) maintains that HIV-infected 
practitioners have an ethical obligation to warn their patients 
of the risks of transmission, and requires doctors to obtain the 
patient's informed consent before performing invasive proce-
dures.212 Although the great majority of state health depart-
ment guidelines have rejected routine notification of prospec-
tive patients, a few have required notification prior to "expo-
sure-prone procedures. "213 
After analyzing these competing perspectives, we believe that 
using the "informed consent" doctrine to require disclosure of 
a surgeon's HIV status is mistaken. Requiring practitioners 
with HIV to disclose their status to patients goes beyond the 
ordinary requirements of informed consent in several respects. 
First, informed consent has never required an affirmative 
disclosure by the physician of all factors in her background 
that might involve risk to the patient. 214 Indeed, the common 
refused to give it information about a rumor that one of the hospital's doctors was 
HIV-positive. Id. at 783. While the court enjoined the FBI from breaking its contract 
with the facility, the court held that the facility's refusal to provide adequate 
information about the risk of HIV transmission precluded Dr. Doe from recovering 
damages. Id. at 786. Specifically, the court held that, under§ 501 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, the question whether a person with an infectious disease is "otherwise qualified" 
requires an "individualized inquiry into the nature, duration, and severity of the risk· 
[of HIV transmission), as well as the probabilities" of transmitting the disease. Id. 
at 784 (citing School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). By refusing to provide information, Dr. Doe blocked this inquiry and 
thus could not recover damages for his claim of discrimination. Id. at 786. 
211. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 5. 
212. Gostin, supra note 71, at 304. 
213. See ELISE GOUTIER, THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HIV-INFECTED 
HEALTH CARE WORKERS 17-18 (1993). 
214. Under the common law, informed consent has been read to require disclosure 
of either: all information a reasonable practitioner would disclose under the circum-
stances, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (holding that 
doctors owed a duty to inform the patient of possible, serious collateral hazards of a 
treatment where there existed a rather high incidence of such hazards), Natanson v. 
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law notions of informed consent do not require disclosure of 
facts about how well-rested the practitioner is, his history of 
alcohol intake, his emotional health, or his medical school 
grades. 215 Such factors. probably pose a more statistically 
significant risk to the patient's health than a surgeon's HIV 
status. Also, informed consent has never served as a vehicle to 
pry into the physician's otherwise private affairs. 216 
Rather than requiring disclosure about the practitioner, 
informed consent requires disclosure about the proposed 
procedure and its significant risks. Medical negligence provides 
the legal redress if the practitioner negligently performs a 
procedure that the patient chose after informed _consent. A 
negligence standard is more appropriate in this area than one 
of informed consent because it allows recovery when a legal 
wrong occurs independent of the fact that a health care worker 
was HIV-positive,217 such as when the practitioner has fraudu-
lently misrepresented his health status.218 
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1105 (Kan. 1960) (holding that a physician must disclose 
information that a reasonable medical practitioner would disclose under the same or 
similar circumstances in order to determine whether a patients has given "intelligent 
consent" to a proposed form of treatment); or all information a reasonable person in 
the patient's circumstances would find relevant to deciding whether to undergo 
treatment, see, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972) (holding that the 
physician's overall duty to the patient includes a "duty ofreasonable disclosure of the 
available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and 
potentially involved"). While the informed consent doctrine recently was extended to 
require disclosure of a doctor's economic interest in his patient's organs or tissues, 
see, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (concluding that 
"a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's· health, 
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician'sjudgment"), cert. denied, 
499 U.S. 936 (1991), it has never been extended to include a doctor's personal 
qualifications to perform the procedure at issue. 
215. Id. 
216. Id; see also Mary K. Logan, Who's Afraid of Whom? Courts Require HIV-
Infected Doctors to Obtain Informed Consent of Patients, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 
504-05 (noting that, given the recent judicial expansion of informed consent doctrine, 
"(d]isclosure also may be required of those with histories of alcoholism, drug abuse, 
and schizophrenic episodes, or those with cataracts or heart disease"). 
217. See, e.g., New York County Jury Awards Man $500,000 in Precedent-Setting 
Case Ouer 'AIDS-Phobia', AIDS POL 'y & L., Mar. 4, 1994, at 1, 7-8 (describing a case 
in which a Jehovah's Witness received damages for an HIV-positive blood transfusion 
because of the hospital's violation of the patient's religious beliefs and because of the 
patient's fear of getting AIDS). 
218. In some cases courts have allowed patients to proceed with lawsuits against 
surgeons who allegedly gave misleading answers to direct questions about their health. 
See Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App.) (reversing summary judgment 
for defendant physician, allowing patient to try to prove that the physician's failure to 
reveal that he suffered symptoms related to HIV when asked about his health resulted 
in compensable damages), transferred with directions to vacate and reconsider, 868 P.2d 
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In addition, the consequences ofrequiring patient notification 
can be devastating for an employee. Patient notification would 
breach the confidential nature of the employee's HIV status. 
Once disclosed, knowledge of the HIV status often spreads 
quickly, ruining the worker's career. Moreover, studies suggest 
that the majority of patients do not want to be treated by 
HIV-infected providers.219 Further, those infected with HIV 
may face discrimination for nonoccupationally related rea-
sons. 220 Thus, any balancing that considers the health care 
professional's personal rights should be resolved in favor of 
voluntary disclosure, rather than mandatory patient notifica-
tion. 
Finally, notification of patients is unnecessary in light of the 
CDC's findings that the risk of HIV transmission in the health 
care setting is infinitesimal. 221 Testimony before the ABA AIDS 
Coordinating Committee suggests that if a review panel has 
authorized an infected health care worker's performance of 
"exposure-prone invasive procedures," there is no public health 
need to disclose the fact of HIV infection to the worker's pa-
tients.222 Proper infection control procedures should allow HIV-
positive health care workers to continue to perform their jobs 
safely and make mandatory disclosure unnecessary. 
B. Post-Treatment Disclosure 
In situations where informed consent is not possible because 
the practitioner did not know she was HIV-positive at the time, 
it has been suggested that health care providers have a duty 
to inform patients of their HIV status after the treatment is 
906 (Cal. 1994). This decision was ultimately reversed. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906 
(Cal. 1994). See also K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 564 (Minn. 1995) (holding that 
the question as to whether consent to a medical examination was induced by the doctor's 
misrepresentation about his health should go to the jury). 
219. Barbara Gerbert et al., Physicians and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: 
What Patients ThinkAboutAcquiredlmmunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262 
JAMA 1962, 1971 (1989) (citing research results which indicate that 60% of those 
surveyed do not believe that HIV-infected surgeons should continue to work). 
220. See generally Sullivan, AIDS Law, supra note 11, at 276 (citing a report by 
the National Commission on AIDS which suggests that HIV cannot be understood 
"outside the context of racism, homophobia, poverty, and unemployment"). 
221. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
222. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 18. 
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completed.223 Access to one dentist's records was granted under 
the "inherent authority [of public health officials] to protect the 
public health and study the epidemiological nature of an 
epidemic ofHIV."224 No informed consent rationale applied, but 
the court found a need for disclosure for public health rea-
sons. 225 In granting access, the court decided that the confiden-
tiality rules which govern public health officials would protect 
the patient's and the dentist's privacy.226 
But some courts have found that the need for post-treatment 
disclosure supersedes any confidentiality interest that the 
doctor or prior patients may have in concealing their HIV 
status. In Doe v. Hershey Medical Center,227 the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court allowed two hospitals to disclose to affected 
patients and certain colleagues that a resident physician who 
participated in their surgical procedures was HIV-positive.228 
The patients were offered the opportunity for counseling and 
testing by the hospitals.229 Viewing the risk of HIV transmis-
sion to be "high," the court concluded that the affected patients' 
right to know the risks attendant to the physician's HIV status 
outweighed the physician's right to confidentiality with respect 
to their medical records.230 
In addition to post-treatment disclosure, some states have 
enacted statutes allowing access to HIV information, and even 
mandatory testing of an exposing individual, following 
occupational exposure to blood or other bodily fluids that may 
transmit HIV.231 Such occupational exposures commonly take 
the form of exposure to the blood of a patient, although the 
rarer situation of a patient's exposure to the blood of a health 
care worker may also be regulated. Of the state laws on this 
topic, a few states232 require that a "significant exposure" occur 
223. See, e.g., infra notes 227-30. 
224. McBarnette v. Feldman, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900, 906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). 
225. Id. at 905. 
226. Id. 
227. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), affd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993). 
228. Id. at 1302. 
229. Although the court allowed disclosure of the possible transmission, it never 
permitted Dr. Doe's name to be revealed to the public. Id. at 1301. 
230. Id. at 1302. 
231. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 199.65-.67 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 19a-582 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN.§ 31-22-9.2 (1991); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 433.075 (1993). 
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 199.65 (requiring notification of patient's HIV 
infection status when there is significant exposure); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
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to trigger the state mandate Of testing or disclosure. 233 
We believe that post-notification to patients about possible 
exposure to HIV from a health care provider is warranted only 
in certain limited circumstances.234 Such circumstances would 
arise where transmission from the provider to at least one 
other patient has occurred, where the patient to be notified has 
had a substantial exposure to the provider's blood or body 
fluids, or where the medical care was accompanied by a signifi-
cant violation of infection control practices such as those in the 
CDC's universal precautions, which thus created a significant 
risk of a substantial exposure. 
Similarly, we believe that state laws mandating testing of an 
exposing person or requiring disclosure of that person's HIV 
status go too far. Especially where no significant exposure has 
occurred and HIV transmission is consequently unlikely, 
revealing an individual's HIV information or testing the blood 
of an individual without consent outweighs any benefit to the 
potentially infected person. A voluntary HIV test of the exposed 
individual would yield most of the information gained from 
testing or disclosing HIV information from the exposing indi-
vidual. Moreover, medicine cannot do anything to prevent HIV 
infection even if one knows whether the fluid came from some-
one who was HIV-positive. 
Finally, voluntary educational mechanisms have proven 
highly effective for encouraging the exposing person to consent 
to testing and for informing the exposed individual of the 
attendant risks. For these reasons, we do not believe that 
582(e)(5) (West 1995) (allowing testing if a significant exposure has occurred); see also 
Pennsylvania High Court OKs Disclosure in Case Involving HN-Infected Physician, 
AIDS POL 'y & L., Nov. 26, 1993, at 1, 2 (discussing Pennsylvania Department of 
Health policy statement that "retroactive notification of a patient is only indicated 
if evidence of significant exposure to the patient has occurred"). 
233. For example, it is possible that spilling blood on intact skin would not be a 
significant exposure, whereas a massive spray of blood into mucous membranes or 
cut skin could be biologically significant (i.e., an exposure to bodily fluids in which 
transmission of HIV is at least biologically possible). 
234. Where a patient was infected with HIV from a source other than a health care 
provider, no privacy or confidentiality issues are raised and the provider is then 
clearly under a duty to inform the patient of the risk that the patient was infected 
with HIV. See Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of California, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that a doctor had a duty to warn a girl that her blood transfusion 
contained HIV-positive blood in a suit raised by a later boyfriend of the girl who had 
contracted HIV from her through sexual contact); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester 
County, 583 A.2d. 422 (Pa. 1990) (holding that a physician owes a duty of care to third 
parties where the physician fails properly to advise the patient and the patient, 
r.elying on the advice, spreads a communicable disease to the third party). 
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mandatory testing or forced disclosure of the exposing indi-
vidual is justified. 
C. AIDS Phobia Cases in the Health Care Setting. 
The so-called "AIDS phobia" litigation235 also raises the is-
sues of informed consent and disclosure by health care workers 
with HIV. "AIDS phobia" litigation is conducted within the 
framework of a body of tort law in most jurisdictions relating 
to the recoverability of emotional distress damages for risk of 
· future disease. 236 Such cases have allowed plaintiffs to recover 
damages for either the plaintiff's present risk of contracting 
the disease in the future or for the plaintiff's mental distress 
and anxiety about the possibility of the future ailment.237 The 
rules for deciding such cases are not uniform among all juris-
dictions, with some requiring an actual exposure to a disease 
agent, while others allow a recovery for a statistically signifi-
cant degree of risk. 238 
In "AIDS phobia" litigation, individuals who may have been 
exposed to HIV have sued based on their fear of exposure or 
their risk of contracting the disease. 239 Courts have rejected such 
claims in a majority of these cases, requiring that plaintiffs 
show actual exposure or transmission of HIV for recovery.240 In 
235. See, e.g. Marriot v. Sedco Forex Int'i Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59, 74-75 
(D. Mass. 1993) (summarizing state law cases which have addressed emotional 
distress claims for the fear of contracting AIDS); Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 
."F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (confronting for the first time in the circuit the question 
of"whether the fear of contracting AIDS can form the basis of a cause of action under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act"), aff d, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (involving 
earliest usage of term AIDS phobia to describe such litigation). 
236. See Logan, supra note 216, at 494-96. See also supra note 235 and infra note 
241 
237. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.R., 202 P. 919 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (allowing 
jury instructions on damages for a reasonable apprehension of future disability or 
deformity resulting from injuries sustained by plaintiff in cable car accident). But see 
Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393-94 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that allowing 
an AIDS phobia tort without demonstration of actual exposure or significant risk is 
impractical and would result in an additional cause of action in every case of adultery 
because the spread of AIDS provides a risk, however small, of contracting the disease 
any time one "deviate[s) from the marital nest">'. 
238. See infra notes 240-43. 
239. E.g., Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1202-04. 
240. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prod., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(rejecting paramedic's claim for fear of HIV infection after a needle-stick from a used 
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some cases, courts have required a showing of actual exposure 
plus a likelihood of developing AIDS before allowing recovery 
for emotional distress damages.241 However, a few cases have al-
lowed emotional distress recoveries where the risk of HIV 
transmission was significant, for example where sexual partners 
had unprotected sex with multiple partners.242 
In the health care environment, a number of courts have 
allowed recovery in instances where plaintiffs have not tested 
positive for HIV but where they also had alleged negligent and 
significant exposure to HIV243 or negligent breach of industry 
syringe); Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 178 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holding on 
remand that a statistically insignificant chance that plaintiff contracted AIDS from 
surgeon precluded recovery of emotional distress damages for fear of AIDS), 
transferred with directions to uacate and reconsider, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994); Barrett 
v. Danbury Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 749 (Conn. 1995) (involving a patient exposed to 
blood during rectal examination); Brzoska v. Olson, No. 284, 1995 Del. LEXIS 339, 
at *20 (Del. Sept. 8, 1995) (denying recovery for fear of contracting AIDS from a 
dentist who later died of AIDS absent a showing of any physical harm); Griffin v. 
American Red Cross, Civil Action No. 93-5924, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,838, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (denying recovery to plaintiff for "fear of AIDS" were plaintiffs fear 
only lasted 24 hours); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(providing no recovery for hospital employee bitten by inmate where there was no 
proof that inmate was HIV-infected and employee was HIV-negative); Doe v. Doe, 519 
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying recovery to the wife in a divorce 
action where she made no allegation that her husband was HIV-positive and that she 
had contracted HIV); Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 623 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa. 
1993) (denying recovery where plaintiff-wife in an in vitro program was told that the 
blood she received was HIV-positive, although the blood proved to be HIV-negative 
after additional testing); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 
S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff could have no recovery for fear 
of exposure to AIDS because she was unable to show actual exposure to HIV and 
tested HIV-negative after suffering a needle-stick in hospital); Funeral Servs. by 
Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 85 (W. Va. 1991) (rejecting 
a mortician's claim of fear of HIV transmission where exposure to HIV was not 
alleged). 
241. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31F.3d1197, 1204-06 (2d Cir. 1994) (sur-
veying the "fear-of-developing-AIDS cases"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); Harper 
v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that 
the law does not recognize recovery for emotional distress resulting from fear of an 
unproven event); Petri v. Bank ofN.Y., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding 
that recovery for exposure to HIV without transmission would be based on uncertainty 
as the specter of becoming infected and developing AIDS is too remote). 
242. Cf Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that 
evidence of high-risk sexual activity may be relevant to a cause of action for wrongful 
transmission); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (involving a wife's 
claim against adulterous husbancj and holding that there exists no actionable right 
to exclusive sexual intercourse with a spouse and that wife's fear of contracting 
sexually transmitted diseases was not actionable absent showing that she was actually 
exposed to these diseases). 
243. See, e.g., Mariott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (involving a claim by oil rig worker who was inoculated with a vaccine 
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standard precautions regarding HIV transmission. 244 For exam-
ple, a New York court has held that the risk of infection was 
significant where there existed circumstantial evidence, such as 
a discarded hypodermic needle, of exposure to HIV infection. 245 
Cases such as this one, which involve a significant and unneces-
sary exposure to an HIV source, contrast sharply with situations 
in which HIV-positive providers use industry standard precau-
tions which create no significant risk to the patient. These cases 
appear to follow the majority rule outside the health care 
setting, requiring some negligence or significant exposure before 
holding a health care provider liable for emotional distress 
caused by a patient's fear of contracting AIDS.246 
A few cases, however, have allowed patients to recover damag-
es for emotional distress where the patient learned after surgery 
that the surgeon was HIV-positive, even though there had been 
no actual exposure to the blood of the surgeon and standard 
industry precautions had been followed. 247 The most notable 
example is Faya v. Almaraz,248 a Maryland decision in which the 
court allowed plaintiffs to sue for their fear of contracting HIV 
even though they "did not identify any actual channel of trans-
mission of the AIDS virus."249 In allowing the case to proceed, 
the court mentioned the Acer situation as a factor establishing 
that it was objectively reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear HIV 
contaminated by HIV and holding that the worker "exhibited compensable emotional 
damage under the Jones Act and the general maritime law for his fear of contracting 
AIDS"); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) 
(allowing a police officer who was bitten by an HIV-infected patient to recover for 
emotional distress even though police officer subsequently tested HIV-negative); 
Corrections Officer Can Sue Hospital Over AIDS Exposure, Lower Court Rules, 3 
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 365 (Mar. 4, 1994) (describing a case from the New York 
Supreme Court in Warren County in which the court allowed a corrections officer to 
file suit against a hospital where he was sprayed with blood from an AIDS patient). 
244. See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 
WL 515825 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993) (involving a situation in which a surgeon 
allegedly operated on patients while having open sores on his hands and not using 
proper barrier techniques, even after a warning from the State Board of Medical 
Examiners), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). 
245. E.g., Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) 
(custodian stuck by hypodermic needle in trash). 
246. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31F.3d1197, 1202-04 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995); see also Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 
1528, 1533-34 (denying recovery for damages from emotional distress where plaintiff 
was not exposed to toxic substance and where plain tiff manifested no physical injury). 
247. E.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995); Barrett v. Danbury 
Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 759 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting). 
248. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). 
249. Id. at 336-37. 
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transmission in a health care setting.250 However, the Maryland 
court overlooked a crucial distinction from the Acer case; 
Dr. Acer had used infection control procedures that had been 
manifestly below the industry standard.251 By contrast, the 
surgeon in Faya followed normal industry precautions which 
make the risk of HIV transmission from an HIV-infected sur-
geon to his patient immeasurably low.252 
We believe that the Maryland court erred in upholding the 
reasonableness of emotional distress damages in circumstances 
where the risk of transmission is as low as that which exists in 
the case of. a properly practicing surgeon. Emotional distress 
damages should be recoverable based upon a showing that 
infection control procedures were substandard. Courts agree that 
a patient's fear must be reasonable before allowing recovery on 
an AIDS phobia tort. Given the low risk of contracting HIV from 
a medical professional who follows proper infection control 
procedures, a person's fear that she has contracted AIDS from 
an HIV-positive doctor is not objectively reasonable unless she 
identifies a specific route of infection or offers evidence that the 
health care provider did not follow proper infection control 
procedures. 253 
In contrast to the opinion in Faya, we believe that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court recently suggested a better approach in 
Brzoska v. Olson.254 It held that a patient cannot recover for fear 
of contracting AIDS from a dentist who later died of AIDS, 
250. Id. 
251. CDC, Transmission of HN Infection-Florida, supra note 1, at 27. 
252. Faya, 620 A.2d at 336. 
253. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(stating that "Pennsylvania case law supports the position that plaintiff must show 
exposure to the AIDS virus before he can recover"); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (denying a claim of an x-ray technician who was bitten by a 
prison inmate though there existed no evidence that the inmate had AIDS); Ordway 
v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying 
recovery against surgeon, with "no broken glove, pierced skin, patient bite, etc., which 
distinguishes the operations in question from any other"); McBarnette v. Feldman, 
582 N.Y.S.2d 900, 907-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (declining certification ofa class action 
by patients against the estate of an HIV-infected dentist because of differences among 
the patients, including possible differences in practice ofinfection control procedures); 
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying claim of wife against 
adulterous husband where she could not establish exposure to AIDS); Funeral Servs. 
by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991) 
(concluding that if "a suit for damages is based solely on the plaintiffs fear of 
contracting AIDS, but there is no evidence of an actual exposure to the virus, the fear 
is unreasonable and this [c]ourt will not recognize a legally compensable injury"). 
254. No. 284, 1995 Del. LEXIS 339 (Del. Sept. 8, 1995). 
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absent a reasonable fear of exposure to AIDS.255 However, the 
court specifically held that a fear of AIDS is reasonable only if 
the patient has had an actual exposure to HIV. 
It is unreasonable for a person to fear infection when that 
person has not been exposed to a disease .... 
AIDS is a disease that spawns widespread public 
misperception based upon the dearth of knowledge con-
cerning HIV transmission. Indeed, plaintiffs rely upon the 
. ~egree of public misperception about AIDS to support their 
claim that their fear was reasonable. To accept this argu-
ment is to contribute to the phobia. Were we to recognize a 
claim for the fear of contracting AIDS based upon a mere 
allegation that one may have been exposed to HIV, totally 
unsupported by any medical evidence or factual proof, we 
would open a Pandora's Box of "AIDS-phobia" claims by 
individuals whose ignorance, unreasonable suspicion or 
general paranoia cause them apprehension over the slightest 
of contact with HIV-infected individuals or objects .... 
In sum, we find that, without actual exposure to HIV, the 
risk of its transmission is so minute that any fear of con-
tracting AIDS is per se unreasonable.256 
Accordingly, a surgeon or dentist with HIV should face the risk 
of damages for emotional distress only when that medical 
professional did something professionally negligent, such as 
performing a medical procedure without following proper 
infection control procedures, and should not face the risk of such 
damages merely as a result of his status of being HIV-positive. 
D. Advertising of Negative HIV Test Results 
Some health care workers, particularly dentists, advertise the 
fact that they have tested HIV-negative.257 Such advertisements 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. See, e.g., AIDS Tests for Health Caregivers?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1992, 
at 27 (describing a telephone listing service called" AIDS Negative Professionals Inc.," 
that charges health care workers up to $99 a year to be listed as HIV-negative). 
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fuel public fear and misunderstanding with respect to HIV and 
the possibility of its transmission in the health care setting; they 
also lead to further discrimination against persons with HIV. 
Even if an advertisement refers more precisely to "negative HIV 
test results," rather than to "negative HIV status," the object of 
the advertisement seems to remain the same: to. convince 
prospective patients that the health care worker is free of HIV 
infection. 
Although an advertisement may be accurate as of the time of 
the HIV test, the fact may later prove false because the test only 
provides information regarding an earlier moment in time, due 
to the "window periOd" and subsequent risks of exposure. 258 In 
1991, the Council on Ethics, Bylaws and Judicial Affairs of the 
American Medical Association adopted a code of ethics provision 
stating that advertisement to the public of HIV-negative test 
results without conveying additional information which clarified 
the scientific significance of this fact is a misleading omission.259 
The ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee does not believe that 
these advertisements provide a significant service to patients 
and, for that reason, opposes the practice of advertising negative 
HIV status. 
E. Refusal to Treat Patients Who Refuse to Disclose Their 
HN Status to Health Care Professionals 
Some physicians and facilities have declined to treat patients 
who would not disclose their HIV status.260 This has resulted in 
several recoveries by patients against facilities for discrimi-
natory refusal to treat patients with HIV.261 In addition, a 
statute that would have allowed a physician to test a "high-risk" 
patient for HIV without the patient's consent has been declared 
unconstitutional.262 
258. See supra note 71 (discussing definition of "window period"). 
259. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 125. 
260. E.g., Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (D. Del. 1993). 
261. E.g., Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991); Doe v. Jamaica 
Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); California Emergency Clinic Settles 
with HN-Patient It Refused To Treat, 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 47 (Dec. 9, 1993); see 
also Mauro A. Montoya, Jr., If I Tell You, Will You Treat Me?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
363 (1994) (discussing disclosure of HIV status to health professionals and describing 
incidents and personal feelings about medical profession's failure to treat author and 
other HIV-positive patients). 
262. Hill v. Evans, No. 91-A-626-N, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19878, at *10 (M.D. Ala. 
Oct. 7, 1993). 
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Questions about a patient's HIV status are an appropriate 
part of a medical history work-up, but any patient should be 
entitled to refuse to disclose this information in the interests of 
personal privacy and because of the risk of discrimination 
including the risk of a discriminatory refusal to receive medical 
treatment. Practitioners should take the same "universal 
precautions" whether or not the patient is known to be HIV-
positive because many patients who are HIV-positive are not 
aware of their infection. 263 
The ABA has adopted a policy that health care providers 
should not refuse to treat or limit treatment because of an 
individual's actual or perceived HIV status, and an HIV test 
should not be routinely required as a condition for health care 
treatment. 264 Several other authorities support the ABA's policy 
statement on this point. A federal court recently issued the first 
decision in a suit brought by the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
(ADA). 265 The court granted summary judgment against a 
Louisiana dentist who refused to treat patients with AIDS and 
found that such a refusal to treat violated the ADA. 266 Since it . 
is unlawfulto refuse to treat an HIV-positive person under the 
ADA, it should also be unlawful to require disclosure of HIV 
status prior to treatment because the fact of HIV infection does 
not lead necessarily to a risk of transmission. In addition, the 
ABA has taken the position that HIV testing should be 
conducted only after informed consent.267 We believe that 
consent procured under the veiled threat that health care 
treatment will be withheld constitutes coerced consent and, 
263. But see Court Rejects Discrimination in Use of Safety Precautions with HIV 
Patient, 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 47 (Dec. 9, 1993) (describing a case from New York 
in which the court "ruled" that an "employer whose workers took universal precau-
tions to protect themselves while performing dental work on an HIV-positive patient 
did not unlawfully discriminate against the patient"). 
264. American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, supra note 190, at 12, §§ D.2 & E.2. 
265. United States v. Morvant, No. 93-3251, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3379 (E.D. La. 
Mar. 22, 1995). 
266. Id. at *33; see also D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995) (entering 
a default judgment against a defendant dentist and finding the dentist in violation 
of the ADA for failing to treat a plaintiff solely because of the plaintiff's HIV-positive 
status); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying summary 
judgment to defendant dentist who refused to treat HIV-positive patient, and allowing 
plaintiff to proceed with claim of violation of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act); cf Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnosis and Discrimination, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 
1602 (1993) (noting that the prohibition on discriminatory refusal to provide medical 
treatment to people because of HIV infection includes such refusals to treat infants). 
267. American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, supra note 190, at 12, § E.2. 
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therefore, is not consistent with the requirement of voluntary, 
informed consent. 268 
F. Conclusions 
Informed consent is a legal concept which requires health 
care workers to disclose to patients medically relevant infor-
mation concerning the risks of any procedure that the patient 
may undertake. Personal facts about a health care provider · 
have never been included among the types of information 
which the law requires a health care worker to disclose-even 
where those facts, such as lack of sleep or personal trauma, 
may indeed affect the patient's care. Given the infinitesimal 
risk of HIV transmission in the health care setting, the HIV 
status of a health care worker does not constitute the type of 
information that a health care worker should be required to 
disclose to a patient either before or after performing a 
noninvasive medical procedure. 
IV. INSURANCE 
As the foregoing cases illustrate, statutes provide and courts 
recognize that discrimination against HIV-infected health care 
workers in their employment is unlawful.269 However, health 
care workers (and workers generally) continue to face discrimi- . 
nation in their ability to obtain and enjoy some fringe benefits 
of employment-specifically, medical and other insurance 
coverage-as a result of HIV infection. In late 1994, the 
Chicago director of the EEOC noted that one-fourth of the suits 
filed by the EEOC in federal courts under the ADA were filed 
on behalf of AIDS patients fighting caps on their health insur-
ance. 270 
268. See supra Part Ill.A. 
269. See supra Part II. 
270. See EEOC Attorney Says Many ADA Charges Filed with Agency Are Reason-
able Claims, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 232 (Dec. 6, 1994) (stating that the EEOC 
has filed 41 ADA suits in federal courts, 25% of which have involved AIDS patients 
fighting health insurance caps, and that the EEOC has not yet lost an ADA case). 
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Interestingly, the insurance industry generally has recog-
nized the low risk of HIV transmission in the health care 
workplace and has not significantly altered professional 
malpractice standards because of the AIDS epidemic. Avoiding 
a fear-driven approach, as these insurers have done, is wise. 
In the future, an approach not driven by fear also should be 
legally required, because recent court decisions have extended 
the ADA's antidiscrimination mandate to include insurance 
companies and other providers of benefit plans. The final Part 
of this Article will review these developments in the insurance 
industry and the governing law. 
A Insurance Against Contracting HIV Infection on the Job 
In the early 1990s,. some insurers began selling policies that 
provide benefits to workers who become infected with HIV in 
the course of their occupation.271 At least one commentator 
viewed this development as an indication that insurers believe 
that the risk of insuring health care workers is relatively 
low. 272 Some policies were designed to pay only if the infection 
was determined to have resulted from ajob-related injury, such 
as an accidental needle-stick injury.273 Other policies were 
designed to provide coverage even without proof that the 
insured became infected on the job.274 In either case, the 
advantage these policies offered was that the insured would be 
entitled to benefits before incurring reimbursable medical 
expenses, as required by a medical expense policy, or before 
becoming disabled, as required by a disability policy. 
Many of these policies provided for a lump-sum benefit. For 
example, Harvard University obtained a policy that paid health 
care workers $100,000 if they became infected with HIV at the 
workplace.275 The American Medical Association offered a 
similar plan, offering up to $500,000 for practicing doctors and 
271. See Brett Chase, Insurance Companies Meet Special Demands, 88 Bus. REC., 
Aug. 10, 1992, at 32; Sabin Russell, Insurers Peddle AIDS Policies to Health Workers, 
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30, 1992, at A16. 
272. See Russell, supra note 271, at A16. 
273. Id. 
274. See id. 
275. Insurance Companies Thld to Stem Large Payments for AIDS Exposure, 
Associated Press, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. 
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lower amounts for residents and medical students.276 This type 
of coverage met with both praise and resistance. One commen-
tator noted that the availability of such coverage would enable 
infected health care workers to forego conducting certain proce-
dures that may be perceived as presenting a higher risk of 
transmission, 277 and also may encourage noninfected workers 
to seek routine testing.278 Other commentators worried that 
offering insurance against HIV was not economically sound. 
For example, Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Robert F. 
Googins warned insurance companies that he would not 
approve such policies. Ht;! said that insurance which is not 
based on economic loss is "fraught with abuse."279 
At least one group of health care workers collectively bar-
gained for special disability insurance for HIV infection.280 
Coverage in that case was limited to infection from workplace 
incidents, but the policy provided $100,000 in disability in-
surance.281 The attention that HIV insurance coverage received 
a year or two ago seems to have decreased. Perhaps this 
decline can be attributed to a public perception that this type 
of insurance coverage is no longer newsworthy or that the 
coverage never captured its intended market. It is also possible 
that the perceived risk of contracting HIV at the workplace is 
so low that acquiring these insurance policies is not a priority 
for health care workers. 
B. Professional Malpractice 
While public reaction to the Acer cluster282 might suggest 
that professio.nal liability insurance carriers would restrict the 
availability of such insurers in the health care field (perhaps 
276. AMA Offers AIDS Indemnity Insurance, UPI, Nov. 13, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. 
277. If the risk is negligible, however, the value of this incentive is questionable. 
It may be more realistic to assume that the benefit of this type of coverage is to 
protect the health care worker who is prevented unjustly from practicing in the health 
care field because of fear and prejudice. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying 
text. 
278. AIDS Policy for Doctors Hailed, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 2, 1991, at 20. 
279. Id. 
280. Diane E. Lewis, Brigham Nurses Win HIV Policy; $100,000 Guarantee for 
Those Infected, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 1992, at 69. 
281. Id. 
282. See supra Part I.C. 
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requiring HIV testing before issuing or renewing policies), such 
has not been the case.283 Concerns that state adoption of the 
CDC guidelines on HIV-infected health care workers also might 
affect the availability of professional liability insurance appear 
not to have been well-founded.284 Insurers apparently have 
been influenced more by the low risk of HIV transmission from 
provider to patient than by the publicity or state regulation. 
A report in the American Medical News285 in late 1992 indicat-
ed that professional liability insurers had not increased their 
rates at all because of HIV-infected physicians.286 
The report discusses HIV-related claims filed with three 
malpractice insurers.287 The insurers reported that physicians 
were being sued for transmission of HIV even though federal 
health officials stated that there was no substantiated case of 
a physician transmitting the virus to a patient.288 Under most 
policies, insurers would be required to pay to defend a negli-
gence claim for HIV infection. That rates have not increased 
due to HIV infection suggests that the relative infrequency and 
low likelihood of success of these lawsuits mitigate the possible 
adverse effects of paying defense costs on the professional 
liability market as a whole. . 
At least one carrier is considering defending, but not in-
demnifying, infected physicians for claims arising from their 
failure to follow CDC recommendations.289 Other insurance 
companies are considering providing disability insurance for 
physicians who become HIV infected, provided that they refrain 
from performing exposure-prone procedures, in accordance with 
the CDC guidelines.290 
There is no indication that professional liability insurers are 
either inquiring about the HIV status of physician applicants 
or refusing to issue coverage to HIV-infected health care 
283. See Kuvin, supra note 2, at 118; Michael R. Ragan, AIDS: Liability for Health 
Care Workers and Other Emerging Doctrines (Aug. 13, 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
284. Ragan, supra note 283. 
285. Bill Clements, No Rate Hikes for HN Claims, But Insurers Urge Caution, AM. 




289. See PAINTER, supra note 71, at 10. 
290. Id. (citing as examples physician-owned companies in Michigan and New 
Jersey offering a $100,000 insurance benefit). 
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workers. 291 If certain health care workers actually presented 
a higher professional liability risk (e.g., those who perform 
certain types of invasive procedures), the insurer would be cost-
justified in charging higher premiums for those individuals.292 
Similarly, if the risk were so high that the worker would be 
uninsurable, the insurer could decline to issue the coverage. 
One commentator has observed that the insurer could lawfully 
exclude the applicant, so long as the insurer had a "legitimate 
interest in protecting the health, safety and. welfare of its 
potential insureds' patients, which includes protecting the 
society from the harm of an individual."293 
For now, however, insurers apparently have concluded that 
HN infection is not a significant risk to be taken into account 
when underwriting professional liability coverage. 
C. Extension of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to Cover Employee Benefits 
Recently, one federal court concluded that the ADA's 
antidiscrimination mandate on employers294 also applies to a 
trade union that provides insurance to employees and other 
individuals. In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive 
Wholesaler's Association of New England,295 the First Circuit 
held that a trade association, which provided health insurance 
coverage for its members, could be treated as an employer 
under Title I of the ADA because it exercised control over the 
individual members' benefits. The court ruled that the insurer 
must prove that any cap it placed on benefits paid to AIDS 
patients was nondiscriminatory.296 While Carparts involved a 
291. Malpractice carriers, including St. Paul, Cigna, and CNA and physician-owned 
insurance companies such as Illinois State Medical Insurance Exchange and MAG 
Mutual, do not require HIV testing of physicians as a condition of coverage. Id. at 9. 
See also GOUTIER, supra note 213, at 44 (discussing whether malpractice insurers can 
require applicants to take an HIV test). 
292. Ragan, supra note 283. 
293. Id. 
294. The ADA expands the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which prohibits employers that receive federal 
funds from discriminating on the basis of handicap, to prohibit all employers with 15 
or more employees engaged in commerce from discriminatory action. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). 
295. 37 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994). 
296. Id. 
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self-insured company rather than a traditional insurer, this 
ruling appears to confirm an earlier holding by a federal 
district judge in New York that insurers are considered em-
ployers under the ADA. 297 
Treating providers of health insurance as employers subjects 
them to the ADA's broad antidiscrimination mandate. The ADA 
prohibits an employer from: (1) limiting the access of disabled 
persons to benefits,298 (2) using pre-existing conditions to limit 
access of disabled persons to benefits,299 (3) reducing benefits 
for disabled persons,300 or (4) reducing benefits based on a 
classification that has no sound actuarial basis. 301 These ADA 
protections are tempered by a broad exception for bona fide 
· benefit plans. The ADA states that it does not prohibit or 
restrict: 
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, 
health maintenance organizations, or any agent, or 
entity that administers benefit plans, or similar 
organization from underwriting risks, classifying 
risks, or administering such risks that are based 
on or not inconsistent with State law; or 
(2) a person o·r organization covered by this chapter 
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or ad-
ministering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan 
that are based on underwriting risks, classifying 
risks, or administering such risks that are based 
on or not inconsistent with State law; or 
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter 
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or ad-
ministering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan 
that is not subject to State laws that regulate 
insurance. 
297. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 63 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. (CCH) 'I 42,846, at 78,649, 78,654 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) ("In making these 
payments, [the insurers) are administering funds which are being distributed on 
behalf of the multi-employer pension plans. In that sense I think it is clear that 
Congress intended to cover them."). 
298. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1994). 
299. S. REP. No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1989) (Senate Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources). 
300. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1994). 
301. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act].302 
In June 1993, the EEOC approved an interim enforcement 
guidance (EEOC Guidance) on disability-based limitations in 
employer-provided health insurance.303 The EEOC Guidance 
directs EEOC investigators to make an initial determination 
of whether a challenged insurance term or provision is a 
"disability-based distinction."304 A disability-based distinction 
is one that singles out a particular disability or a procedure or 
treatment used exclusively for treatment of a particular 
disability, such as exclusion of a drug used only to treat 
AIDS.305 
If the EEOC determines that an employer's insurance plan 
contains a disability-based distinction, the EEOC considers the 
burden of proof to have shifted to the employer306 to show that 
(1) the health insurance plan is either a bona fide insurance 
plan that is consistent with either the applicable state law or 
a bona fide self-insured plan; and (2) the disability-based 
distinction is not being used as a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of the ADA. 307 
To gain the protection of the ADA bona fide benefit plan 
exception, according to the EEOC Guidance, employers must 
first show that a bona fide insured plan exists and pays bene-
fits, that its terms have been accurately communicated to 
eligible employees, and that its terms are not inconsistent with 
applicable state law.308 If the plan is a self-insured plan, the 
302. Id. § 1220l(c). 
303. (1991-1994 Transfer Binder] Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 'I 5375, at 6416 (June 
8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance]. The EEOC is currently working on final 
enforcement guidelines which "will be broader than the interim guidance and will 
draw on real-life problems." EEOC Official Defends Guidance on ADA and Health 
Plans, [Employment Practices] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 610, at 4 (Dec. 8, 1993). 
304. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6422. 
305. Id. 
306. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (declaring 
that the complainant in a Title VII action must carry the initial burden under the 
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination; the burden then 
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
treatment of the complainant), aff'd, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). 
307. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6418. The EEOC places the burden of 
proving a bona fide benefit plan exception on the employer because employers have 
the greatest access to facts and such a standard is consistent with the imposition of 
the burden. of proof on employers in Title VII policies. See EEOC Official Defends 
Guidance on ADA and Health Plans, supra note 303, at 4. 
308. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6420-21. 
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employer need only show that the plan exists and pays benefits 
and that its terms have been accurately communicated to 
covered employees.309 
Once the employer has proven that a bona fide plan exists, 
the employer must then show that the challenged disability-
based distinction is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
the ADA. The EEOC defines "subterfuge" as an exclusion of 
disability-based treatment that is not justified by the risks or 
costs associated with a disability.310 
The EEOC Guidance offers no single formula for determining 
what constitutes "subterfuge" and instead gives a nonexclusive 
list of possible business justifications. For example, an employ-
er may show that it has not engaged .in the disability-based 
disparate treatment alleged.311 An employer can also establish 
that legitimate actuarial data, or actual or reasonably antici-
pated e~perience, justify the disparate treatment, and that 
conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or experience 
are treated in the same manner.312 
The EEOC Guidance list of acceptable justifications also 
includes the justification that disparate treatment is necessary 
to ensure the fiscal soundness of the challenged insurance plan 
so long as no feasible alternative to the disability-based distinc-
tion exists.313 An employer may prove that the insurance 
practice is necessary to prevent an "unacceptable change" in 
the plan or the premiums, such as a drastic increase in 
premiums or a drastic alteration to the scope of the coverage.314 
Finally, the employer may defend the denial of disability-
specific treatment by proving through reliable scientific evi-
dence that the treatment does not provide any benefit or 
medical value.315 
A recent ruling suggests that the EEOC will not tolerate 
many asserted business justifications for disability-based 
distinctions. In Mason Tenders District Council Trust Fund, 316 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 6421. 
311. Id. That is, if a charging party alleges that a benefit cap of a particular 
catastrophic disability is discriminatory, the respondent may show that its health 




314. Id. at 6422. 
315. Id. 
316. See 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 453 (Feb. 15, 1993). 
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the EEOC regional office in New York held that a union could 
not eliminate from its health insurance plan a benefit that pro-
vided for payment of expenses arising from HIV-related con-
ditions.317 In that case, the Mason Tenders District Council 
Trust Fund (Fund) amended its health insurance coverage on 
July 1, 1991 to exclude payment for expenses related to HIV 
infection, AIDS, and/or AIDS-related complex (ARC).318 Later 
that year, a union member with HIV sued the union, the Fund, 
and related parties, claiming that the benefit plan violated the 
ADA. The New York district director of the EEOC ruled that 
the Fund's plan violated the ADA because it discriminated 
against individuals based on their disability, rather than on 
any sound actuarial justification.319 
The Fund subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action 
in federal district court seeking to establish that it was not 
obligated to reinstate insurance coverage for expenses related 
to HIV, AIDS, or ARC.320 In response, the EEOC filed its own 
suit against the Fund on June 9, 1993, the day after it had 
issued the Interim Guidance, charging the Fund with violating 
the ADA.321 This suit signaled the EEOC's determination to 
define the scope of the bona fide benefit plan exception and to 
enforce the provisions set forth in the guidance. 
The issue to be decided in Mason Tenders is whether the 
Fund denied benefits on the basis of bona fide actuarial as-
sumptions or subterfuge.322 In an order denying the Fund's 
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge stated that, in 
order to establish a violation of the ADA, the Fund's benefi-
ciaries will have to prove that the Fund significantly affected 
a person's ability to gain benefits because of the person's 
disability.323 The beneficiaries will not have to prove that the 
317. See AIDS: Cutting Benefits Violates ADA, N. Y. EEOC District Director Finds, 
20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 422 (Feb. 15, 1993). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. See AIDS: N. Y. Welfare Fund Seeks Court Order to Kill EEOC AIDS Bias 
Ruling Under ADA, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 563 (Mar. 8, 1993). 
321. See EEOC Sues New York Benefits Fund Under ADA for Restricting Coverage, 
20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1287 (June 14, 1993). 
322. See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 63 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. (CCH) at 78,649, 78,650 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) ("The statute specifically 
contains language that says you can't use the subterfuge of a fund to evade the 
ADA."). 
323. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 
78,655. 
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Fund had specific intent to discriminate. 324 The Fund will have 
the burden of proving that the benefits were denied on the 
basis of bona fide actuarial assumptions rather than subter-
fuge. 325 
Since the EEOC issued its Guidance, one-fourth of the ADA 
cases that the EEOC has filed in federal courts charge insur-
ance plans which incorporate AIDS-based distinctions with 
violating the ADA.326 In Philadelphia, the EEOC District 
Director ruled that a $10,000 lifetime cap on payment for HIV-
related medical treatment in a union health plan violated the 
ADA.327 The director concluded that the union's action consti-
tuted subterfuge because the union trustees did not consider 
capping the health care plan, which originally provided lifetime 
benefits up to $100,000 for any disease or condition, until a few 
months after an employee made claims for AIDS-related 
treatment.328 The EEOC ultimately filed suit against the union 
health plan under the ADA, but in early 1995, the plan agreed 
to drop its cap on AIDS-related treatment and settled the 
case.329 
In a similar matter, the EEOC brought a suit in California 
against an insurance fund which placed a $5000 cap on AIDS-
related benefits while maintaining a lifetime cap of $300,000 
on other catastrophic illnesses.330 In the settlement, the 
insurance fund agreed to remove the cap.331 In March 1994, a 
self-insured company in Connecticut also agreed to remove a 
$10,000 cap on treatments for HIV and AIDS after the New 
York office of the EEOC ruled that the cap violated the ADA.332 
Recently, at least one federal case has been brought to chal-
lenge a cap on insurance for AIDS patients under the ADA.333 
In Carparts, discussed above, the First Circuit held that this 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. See supra note 270. 
327. See EEOC Philadelphia Office Says AIDS Cap Was 'Subterfuge,' Violated ADA 
Provisions, AIDS POL 'y & L., Oct. 1, 1993, at 1. 
328. Id. at 6. 
329. See Union Health Fund Will Drop AIDS Cap Under Consent Decree Reached 
with EEOC, 22 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 103 (Jan. 3, 1995). 
330. See Legal Settlement Requires Removal of Caps on AIDS-Related Claims, 2 
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Oct. 7, 1993). 
331. See id. 
332. See Information in Brief, Bus. INS., Mar. 14, 1994, at 23. 
333. See, e.g., ADA, Virginia Laws Are Cited in Federal Insurance Cap Suit, AIDS 
POL 'y & L., Oct. 1, 1993, at 2 (describing an employee who challenged the employer's 
limits on AIDS treatment reimbursements). 
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self-insured trade association must prove that any cap it placed 
on benefits paid to AIDS patients was non-discriminatory.334 
Few, if any, employers offering health benefit programs can 
meet such a burden or the burden imposed by the EEOC Guid-
ance. 335 A national task force report released by the District of 
Columbia Bar argues that the ADA provision on subterfuge 
will continue to pose practical problems for insurers and 
employers and will be an ongoing point of contention.336 The 
final outcome is difficult to predict, especially because the 
Carparts and McGann v. H & H Music Co. 337 decisions may 
signal the beginning of a significant conflict among the circuits 
concerning what insurers can proffer as viable businessjustifi-
cations.338 
The EEOC Guidance gives further clarity to the ADA's appli-
cation to pre-existing condition clauses. The Guidance confirms 
that blanket pre-existing condition clauses that exclude from 
coverage the treatment of conditions that predate an employ-
ee's eligibility for benefits do not violate the ADA.339 Universal 
exclusions from coverage of all experimental drugs or treat-
ments also are not considered disability-based distinctions.340 
Even coverage limits on certain medical procedures for pre-
existing conditions do not violate the ADA.341 The EEOC 
Guidance notes that the ADA has retroactive application to 
health insurance plans that were adopted prior to the ADA's 
334. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New 
England, 37 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1994). 
335. See ADA Poses Problems for Limits on Employer-Sponsored Health Plans, 
AIDS POL 'y & L., Oct. 29, 1993, at 4. 
336. See id. 
337. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that reduction of lifetime medical 
benefits for AIDS-related claims under self-insured plan did not unlawfully discrim-
inate against employee and was permissive under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) . 
338. See infra notes 347-51 and accompanying text. 
339. EEOC Guidance, supra note 303, at 6419; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1995). 
340. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 303. 
341. See id. The EEOC Guidance suggests, however, that overly restrictive pre-
existing condition clauses, which exclude treatments utilized only for a discrete group 
of related disabilities, may violate the ADA if the plan is not bona fide or the 
provisions are found to be subterfuge. Id. Employers may continue to use such clauses 
"so long as [they] are not used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. Id. The EEOC Guidance gives an example in which a hemophili-
ac employee sues a hypothetical company because its insurance excludes from 
coverage treatment for any pre-existing blood disorders for a period of 18 months. Id. 
at 6420. In this situation, the Guidance asserts, the company must prove that its 
disability-specific pre-existing condition clause is not a subterfuge to avoid violating 
the ADA. Id. (Example 3). 
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July 26, 1990 enactment.342 Therefore, disability-based provi-
sions of pre-ADA health insurance plans will be scrutinized 
under the same subterfuge standard as post-ADA health 
insurance plans.343 
Even if employers' health insurance plans do fall under the 
ADA bona fide benefit plan exception, new employees who are 
HIV-infected will still have access to benefit plan coverage in 
many situations. Large group health plans typically do not 
inquire into the health status of plan beneficiaries as a condi-
tion of coverage, except for special circumstances, such as late 
entry into the plan.344 Small groups often underwrite the 
medical condition of individual employees, but states increas-
ingly restrict the insurers' ability to do so.345 Even without the 
protection of the ADA, therefore, many employers that offer 
health benefit plans to their employees are likely to include 
HIV-infected employees in the covered group. · 
Employers or their benefit plan insurers, however, may 
decline coverage to an employee altogether because nothing in 
either the ADA's provisions or the EEOC Guidance mandates 
that an employer even offer health or life insurance benefits. 
As long as the denial of coverage is based on an actuarial risk 
classification, an employer may choose to decline to offer insur-
ance to a high-risk group.346 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA)347 also contains an antidiscrimination clause348 which 
has been used to challenge reduction claim benefits stemming 
from HIV-related illnesses in two recent cases involving self-
funded plans.349 In both cases, the courts held that placing 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Underwriting late entrants is intended to avoid adverse selection by preventing 
healthy individuals from opting out of the plan until they become ill. Healthy individuals 
must participate so that the plan can spread the risk of covering those who are sick. 
345. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF INS. COMPANIES, 1 OFFICIAL N.A.l.C. MODEL INSUR-
ANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 115-1, 115-7 (1995). 
346. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. V 1993). 
347. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1993) 
348. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
349. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
reduction of lifetime medical benefits for AIDS-related claims under a self-insured 
plan did not unlawfully discriminate against employee and was permissible under 
ERISA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 
416 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that modification of an employer-based self-insured plan 
to include a cap of $25,000 for AIDS-related claims did not violate the provision 
prohibiting discriminatory conduct under ERISA where the health benefits were 
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caps on AIDS benefits in employee benefit plans did not con-
stitute illegal discrimination with respect to benefits under 
ERISA.350 This approach clearly contrasts with that.discussed 
above under the ADA, which was most recently affirmed in 
the First Circuit's decision in Carparts, which suggested that 
it may be unlawful to cap the amount of benefits to be re-
ceived by an insured suffering an HIV-related illness.351 
C. Conclusion 
The impact of HIV on health care workers' access to insur-
ance appears to be about the same as that for most other 
professions. Nothing suggests that HIV-infected health care 
professionals have poorer access to insurance coverage than 
their noninfected colleagues as a result of HIV. Such is as it 
should be, because the ADA's antidiscrimination mandate 
applies to insurers. Courts and the EEOC should continue to 
apply the ADA to insurers, and interpret the exception for 
bona fide benefit plans narrowly, not only on behalf of 
patients, but also on behalf of health care workers. 
If the courts do so, the myth that insurers have a special 
business justification for discriminating against HIV-positive 
patients will be debunked and insurers will be treated more 
like employers. Employees with HIV or other terminal condi-
tions may require expensive medical treatment which will 
affect the cost of health benefit plans, but employers should 
not be permitted to contain costs by limiting coverage for 
HIV-infected health care workers and other employees. The 
Carparts and Mason Tenders cases suggest that, in attempt-
ing to contain costs, employers and insurers alike must be 
careful not to discriminate based on HIV status. · 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Fear of HIV infection has caused some policymakers to 
respond to isolated events like the Acer cluster with calls for 
nonvested and contingent), aff'd, 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993). 
350. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408; Owens, 984 F.2d at 400. 
351. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's As~'n of New 
England, 37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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sweeping solutions such as mandatory HIV testing of all 
health care workers. Based on its research, extensive hear-
ings, and consistent with the judgment of medi~al profes-
sionals and on current medical knowledge, the ABA AIDS 
Coordinating Committee does not believe that mandatory 
testing or forced disclosure of the HIV status of health care 
workers is the proper solution to the problem of preventing 
HIV transmission in the health care system. While such 
solutions respond to the well-publicized fear of becoming 
infected with HIV from health care workers, they are not 
responsive to the scientific facts about the tiny risk of HIV 
transmission from health care worker to patient. It bears 
repeating that since the discovery of the Acer cluster, no 
·additional cases of transmission of HIV from health care 
worker to patient have been identified or even. seriously 
alleged, despite significant effort to find such cases. It is clear 
that health care workers with HIV present an immeasurably 
small risk of transmission in most health care settings. It is 
also clear that even when "exposure-prone invasive proce-
dures" are at issue, any risk posed by an HIV-infected health 
care worker can be controlled by adherence to proper infec-
tion control procedures. Legislative and regulatory concern 
about HIV transmission in the health care setting is better 
placed on encouraging adherence to proper infection control 
procedures, including implementation standards and peer 
review panels that would monitor such adherence. 
Accordingly, the ABA AIDS Coordinating Committee recom-
mends the following public policy actions to address the prob-
lems faced by HIV-infected health care workers and to combat 
public fear of HIV transmission in the health care setting. 
First, mandatory HIV testing of health care workers is not 
warranted, and should not be a requirement of employment, 
credentialling, licensure, professional liability insurance, train-
ing, or education. As the scientific literature and the ABA's 
hearings demonstrated, many medical professionals agree that 
the scientific data does not support mandatory testing of health 
care professionals.352 Monetary costs, the potential adverse 
effects on the health care system, and the rights of individual 
workers far outweigh the value of identifying infected health 
352. Gostin, supra note 34, at 141 ("The current assessment of the risk that 
infected [health care workers] will transmit HIV or HBV to patients during exposure-
prone procedures does not support the diversion of resources that would be required 
to implement mandatory testing programs."). 
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care workers through mandatory testing because no cost 
beneficial decrease in the risk of HIV transmission is likely to 
be achieved. 353 
Second, with respect to informed consent, health care work-
ers should not be required to disclose their HIV status to 
patients under this doctrine. Since the risk of HIV transmis-
sion from health care worker to patient is immeasurably small 
if universal precautions are employed, the fact that a procedure 
is being performed by an HIV-positive individual-where the 
patient would give consent to an HIV-negative individual to 
perform the same procedure-should not be material to a 
reasonable patient's evaluation of the risks of a medical proce-
dure. In the case of the few procedures that are so invasive as 
to involve a documented risk of HIV transmission, peer adviso-
ry panels should be put in place to discuss HIV-related health 
care practice matters and proper infection control procedures. 
HIV-positive health care workers should be encouraged tp 
consult voluntarily on a confidential basis with such peer 
advisory panels. Hospitals, health plans, and other institutions 
should respect the informed medical judgments of such peer 
review panels. 
Third, antidiscrimination mandates, such as those set forth 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act, should be uniformly 
upheld. Health care workers should not face discrimination 
based on their HIV status in employment or with respect to 
receipt of benefits such as medical insurance. Similarly, pa-
tients should not be denied treatment based on their HIV 
status, but may be required to disclose their HIV status solely 
for medical reasons. Confidentiality of the HIV status of 
353. See id. The CDC did not recommend mandatory testing of health care workers 
for HIV and HBV on the grounds that the current assessment of risk does not justify 
the cost of such testing programs. CDC Guidelines, supra note 3, at 6; see also ABA, 
Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 87 (containing testimony of a surgeon who declined 
to recommend mandatory testing of all elective surgery patients just to catch the small 
number of open heart surgery patients who might benefit from such testing). A July 
1991 report by the Pennsylvania Health Department estimated that it would cost $54 
million annually to conduct quarterly HIV testing of the state's health care workers, 
an amount more than twice the total Pennsylvania AIDS-prevention program budget. 
Mandatory HIV Testing Intensifies Across America, ADVOCATE, Sept. 10, 1991, at 40. 
Another 1991 study found that the cost of even one-time testing with pre- and post-
test counseling for health care workers at San Francisco General Hospital would be 
approximately $886,000 per year, twice the entire infection control annual budget for 
that hospital. Id. at 42. A 1991 study by the AIDS Policy Center found that HIV and 
HBV testing for the seven million health care workers in the United States would cost 
between $350 and $525 million. Id. 
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patients and health care workers should be maintained to en-
courage HIV-infected individuals to become tested, learn their 
status, and adhere to appropriate infection control and other 
practices to avoid spread of the infection. 
Fourth, increasing compliance with universal precautions 
should be the focus of government and private efforts to pre-
vent HIV transmission in the health care setting. All health 
care workers should be trained in universal precautions and 
their adherence to these practices should be monitored by their 
institutions. Regular continuing education programs should be 
instituted to assist in compliance with infection control proce-
dures. 
Finally, the legal system should attempt to ensure that its 
decisions uniformly recognize the truly low risk that an HIV-
infected health care workers will transmit HIV to her patients. 
Under the Supreme Court precedent set forth in Arline, all 
individuals, including health care professionals, should not face 
discrimination in employment or insurance actions based on 
their HIV-positive status unless their behavior constitutes a 
significant risk. While the consequences of HIV infection are 
horrible, courts and_ legislators must not forget the risk of HIV 
transmission from a health care worker can hardly be consid-
ered significant. In the history of HIV and AIDS, only one 
medical practice has been documented as the source of HIV 
transmission to patients-the office· of Dr. David Acer. Given 
the extremely low risk of HIV transmission in a health care 
environment where proper infection control procedures are 
followed, courts and legislators must not allow health care 
workers to suffer because of public fear of HIV transmission 
that is not grounded in medial or scientific fact. 
The AIDS Coordinating Committee does not mean for its 
analysis to trivialize public fear about HIV transmission in the 
health care setting. Public fear engendered by the Acer cluster 
has been real. Unfortunately, that fear often has been exacer-
bated to unreasonable proportions by sensationalized media 
reports or failures of public education about the methods and 
risks of HIV transmission. Public fear of HIV transmission 
from an infected health care worker to a patient simply is 
unrelated to the actual risk of such transmission. From both 
a public health and a legal perspective, the appropriate re-
sponses to such public concern are decisions based on scientific 
evidence. Courts .and legislatures have the responsibility to 
ensure that the facts about the low risk of HIV transmission 
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prevail over public hysteria. As was aptly stated in the Com-
mittee's hearings, "public hysteria should never be the engine 
that drives the policy process. "354 In the "battle between emo-
tion, ethics and ... public perception"355 triggered by AIDS 
phobia in the health care setting, the only thing the public has 
to fear from HIV infected health care workers is fear itself. 
354. ABA, Chicago Hearing, supra note 12, at 96. 
355. Id. 
